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ARAB SPRING BRINGS WINDS OF CHANGE TO
THE MAGHREB AND MENA REGION: DOES THAT
SPELL OPPORTUNITY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT AND PROJECT FINANCE?
By Silvano Domenico Orsi*
“You must be the change you wish to see in the world.”**
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I. INTRODUCTION
Turmoil and revolution accompanied the 2011 Arab Spring, be-
ginning in Tunisia and spreading to Egypt and Libya, bringing change
across the Maghreb and Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) re-
gion.  Whether any of the new political, institutional or social reforms
that might be implemented will actually work to attract international
investment in the region, or work to increase opportunities for project
finance and infrastructure development in general, remains to be seen.
* Author, International Business Lawyer, and LL.M. Scholar from the Boston
University School of Law (Class of 2011). Contact email: sdorsi@bu.edu.
** Mahatma Gandhi, Indian philosopher, internationally esteemed for his doc-
trine of non-violence (1869-1948).
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The outlook seems positive, however, especially in key areas such as
clean energy, infrastructure development, and projects that export
power, oil, gas, water, and renewable energy to more developed and
energy-starved nations.  Positive predictions by key players heavily in-
volved in the region, such as the World Bank and EBRD, are also be-
ginning to surface as the uprisings begin to subside, and as the region
begins to favour new democracy, foreign investment, and greater so-
cial reform.
This article provides a positive perspective on what is currently
transpiring in the MENA region, encouraging greater foreign invest-
ment in infrastructure development and project financing initiatives,
as well as promoting increased trade with the region. It highlights the
fact that enormous opportunities in these sectors will result once the
period of unrest and revolution begins to decline.  Growing interna-
tional interest exists in Public-Private Partnership (“PPP”) projects in
the MENA region as outside investors seek greater access to function-
ing infrastructure that will help supply them with precious oil com-
modities and clean energy resources.1  This article also discusses the
need to strengthen the region’s capital markets.  Building stronger do-
mestic financial markets in the region will also help ensure the availa-
bility of international funding for new infrastructure development and
project-financings as the region rebuilds.  This is definitely an area for
foreign investors to involve themselves as they work to develop part-
nerships with the MENA region’s newly formed governments, finan-
cial institutions, and regulators.2
Demand for projects that utilize flexible methods such as the
Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) and Carbon Financing are on
the rise, as they enable developed nations to cost-effectively achieve
emission reductions and removal of carbon from the atmosphere, via
projects carried out in developing countries.3  Developed nations seek
credits under the Kyoto Protocol Rules for their clean energy projects
in the developing MENA region.4  High revenues from these projects
1 The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, Regional Annex, Middle East and
North Africa (2011); The World Bank, Infrastructure Development: The Roles of the
Public and Private Sectors (2005); The World Bank, MENA Regional Conference
on Infrastructure Reform and Regulation, Taking the Infrastructure Agenda For-
ward in the Middle East and North Africa (2009).
2 See Abraham Akkawi, Developing the Financial Capital Market to Raise Ade-
quate Levels of Infrastructure Financing, MENA Regional Conference on Infra-
structure Reform and Regulations (2009).
3 See Roland Berger, Green Growth, Green Profit: How Green Transformation
Boosts Business, in STRATEGY CONSULTANTS GMBH (2011) (“The Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) is the region to watch for remarkable solutions on a grand
scale.”).
4 Id.
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can be used to finance major infrastructure and re-building needs.5
Exporting clean energy to areas like Europe, the United States, GCC
countries, and Asia – all of whom are eager to move away from oil
dependency and fossils fuels, so as to reduce their carbon footprints –
will certainly result in massive revenues as well.6  Governments of de-
veloped countries, (as well as their corporations, banks, and investment
funds), will pursue hundreds of emission-reduction projects in the next
ten years, seeking greater access to the virtually untapped renewable
energy resources in the region; and many of these cost-effective clean
energy projects will also involve the solar, wind, and water sectors.7
A growing need also exists for innovative methods to finance
projects in the region and attract greater investment. Since the region
is comprised primarily of Muslim populations, one solution may be to
combine Islamic Finance and conventional Project-Financing, as this
would attract both outside investors and wealthy Arab investors from
the GCC countries on mutually beneficial and joint-partnership devel-
opment projects.  The importance of focusing on exportation-related
projects in the region is also key to securing access to foreign invest-
ment and lending. This has proven to be scarce in the past,for fear of
the usual currency devaluation issues, elevated project risks, and lack
of stable local institutions across the region—especially in the dictato-
rial regimes found in North Africa. In short, if outside nations can also
reap the benefits of any new or existing energy-producing projects and/
or exporting projects in the region, (that give outside nations greater
access to oil, gas, power, and renewable energy resources), then it may
just be worth the risk for them to invest in the MENA region’s
development.
Western nations should act now and not wait for the dust to
finish settling.  They must do more to invest in the region’s infrastruc-
ture development projects and truly “internationalise” them8 by inject-
ing stable currencies into the MENA region’s projects and markets.
The use of only local currencies generated by non-exporting projects
would create a deadly formula – one that is certain to dissuade any
outside investment, overburden the local banking structure, and ulti-
5 Saleh S. Jallad, The MENA Region and Global Energy Risk, 1 MEES RESEARCH
RPT. 1 (2010).
6 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND THE WORLD BANK, MENA REGIONAL CONCEN-
TRATED SOLAR POWER SCALE-P PROGRAM:  2ND JOINT CSP WORKSHOP (2009), http://
www.docstoc.com/docs/20105419/MENA-Regional-Concentrated-Solar-Power-
Scale-up-Program.
7 See Nikolaus Wohlgemuth, Presentation before the MENA Carbon Forum, Car-
bon Financing for RE Projects: How to overcome the Barriers to unlock the CDM
potential in the RE Sector (2009).
8 See KFW Banken Gruppe & T. Prien, Financing Wind Energy in the MENA
Region, Wind Energy and Development Dialogue (2010).
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mately continue the general feeling of pessimism amongst the region’s
project owners, sponsors, and lenders.9
News has begun to flourish of positive changes sweeping
through the MENA region since the Arab Spring uprisings, and many
G20 countries have recognized the democracy-seeking rebel fractions
as the new legitimate leaders of countries such as Tunisia and
Egypt.10 Even in Libya, the most resource-rich nation in the region, a
new leadership has arisen to meet the demands of change.11  The im-
pact of very recent events, such as Gaddaffi’s dictatorial regime’s
downfall in Libya and Osama bin Laden’s death, may help elevate in-
vestor confidence in region projects and boost stock markets and in-
crease positivity levels of world leaders, inside and outside the
region.12
Change across the MENA region also means that both outside
and regional governments must deliver on their promises of democ-
racy, stability, and prosperity, before violence and extremism arrive in
their place.13 One terrorist’s death does not mean terrorism’s demise.
Nor does it provide for the total elimination of any such project risk in
the region. This also does not mean that we should totally forget the
solid investment opportunities that are becoming available in this
flourishing region.14  Walking away now and not getting properly in-
volved in re-building this region would be devastating to both local and
global economic recovery. It would only ensure more gloom in the form
9 THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK AND PARTNERS JOIN EFFORTS TO TACKLE ARAB
WORLD INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGE (2011).
10 A new Government in Tunisia: Out with the Old?, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 19,
2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/01/new_government_tuni-
sia; Nicole Gauoette, Clinton meets with Egypt’s Transitional Leadership, Visits
Tahrir Square, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-03-16/clinton-visits-tahrir-square-site-of-egyptian-protests-1-.html.
11 Stacey Meichtry & Jay Solomon, Allies Plan Fund for Libyan Rebels, WALL ST.
J. (May 5, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870393710457630
3161699450494.html.
12 See Julia Kollewe & Rowenna Davis, Osama bin Laden’s death boosts stock
markets, THE GUARDIAN (May 2, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
may/02/osama-bin-laden-stock-markets; World Leaders Welcome Bin Laden’s
Death,  CNBC NEWS (May 2, 2011), http://www.cnbc.com/id/42852851.
13 Dr. Amani Abeid Karume, Former President of Zanzibar, Inaugural Lecture
before the Boston University African Presidential Archives and Research Center
(Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.bu.edu/aparc/presidents/karume/.
14 See World Bank President: One Shock away from Crisis, BBC NEWS (Apr. 17,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13108166 (quoting Robert Zoellick:
“The crisis in the Middle East and North Africa underscores how we need to put
the conclusions from our latest world development report into practice. . .waiting
for the situation to stabilise will mean lost opportunities. In revolutionary mo-
ments, the status quo is not the winning hand.”).
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of an expanded global financial crisis and greater unemployment on all
sides of the spectrum.15  Additional elements required for the success
of PFI and PPP infrastructure development projects in the MENA re-
gion are the better use of socially responsible governance strategies,16
and the use of innovative financing techniques, such as the combina-
tion of Islamic Finance with conventional project-financing methods,
to ensure the availability of investment, partnership, and non-recourse
debt lending from outside sources.17
There are numerous opportunities available in the resource-
rich MENA region, and it is important for those interested in progress-
ing new and existing development projects to remain positive, as the
region settles and becomes an ideal investor’s market.18  Our ultimate
task as project managers and project financiers is to seize this new era
of opportunity in the region, while mitigating risks and overcoming
any of challenges that may arise.  Thus, we may ultimately delve into
the risky (but lucrative) world of project finance in a up-and-coming
MENA region.19
For this author in particular, “internationalized” project
financings, of mega-infrastructure development initiatives, and renew-
able energy projects that serve to export energy and commodities from
the MENA region may be the best way forward for growth and stable
recovery.20  During these times of rapid change, there is also a notable
lack of scholarly research in the project finance sector.21  This note at-
tempts to change that by providing insight on some of the important
15 Erin Williams, The Mozal Smelter Project, River of Aluminium, 16 PM NET-
WORK 20 (2002).
16 The World Bank, World Bank Supports Social Accountability Network across
Arab World, Press Release No. 2011/434/MENA (Apr. 15, 2011).
17 See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIG-
ION, RISK AND RETURN 27-28 (Kluwer Law Int’l 1998).
18 SEZNECK & KIRK, INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE GULF: A SOCIOECONOMIC REVOLU-
TION (Routeledge Pub. 2011).
19 WORLD BANK, INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLES OF THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORS (2005).
20 See also INT’L FIN. CORP., LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE NO. 4: FINANCING PRIVATE
INFRASTRUCTURE 43-44 (1996). See generally JEFFREY DELMON, PRIVATE SECTOR IN-
VESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE: PROJECT FINANCE, PPP FINANCE AND RISKS (2d ed.
2009).
21 Although the number of research articles on project finance has dramatically
increased in latter part of this decade, it was reported by Benjamin Esty in early
2002 that, “there has been only one article directly on project finance published in
the four leading finance journals, and not more than 15 articles in all finance jour-
nals, over the last 20 years,”; furthermore, the coverage of project finance in corpo-
rate finance text books is very thin compared to other financing mechanisms, such
as IPO’s, venture capital, and leasing. Benjamin C. Etsy, Why Study Large
Projects? An Introduction to Research on Project Finance, EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT.
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elements that those involved in infrastructure development and pro-
ject finance in the MENA region and beyond should consider.
II. PROJECT FINANCE AND ITS CONSTRAINTS IN THE
REGION
No single definition for Project Finance (“PF”) exists.22  One
definition holds that PF involves the creation of a “legally independent
project company financed with equity from one or more sponsoring
firms and non-recourse debt, for the purpose of investing in,” and fi-
nancing a single purpose or multi-purpose industrial asset.23  An es-
sential feature of PF is that a Special Purpose Vehicle (“SPV”) or
“project company” must be established where the project is to take
place.24  The debt used to finance the project is “non-recourse debt,”
which means that sponsors are only liable for the amount of equity
they put into projects, and that any debt repayment comes from the
project company only, rather than from any other entity involved.25
There are three key decisions to recognize in the use of PF.  First,
there is an investment decision involving an industrial asset (the term
“industrial asset” includes infrastructure development projects).26
Second, there is an organizational decision to create a legally indepen-
dent entity to own and, if a concession is involved, run the asset.27
Project assets do not appear on the sponsor’s balance sheet, represent-
ing a form of “off-balance sheet” finance.28  “The exact accounting
treatment is, however, a function of the chosen organizational form for
the SPV entity (corporation, partnership, etc.), and the sponsor’s frac-
tional interest in and control over the project.”29  In cases such as
those involving only one sponsor, the project’s assets and liabilities
may appear on the sponsor’s balance sheet.30  “Lastly, there is a fi-
nancing decision involving nonrecourse debt.”31  Since the SPV is a le-
vol. 10, no. 2, 2004 at 213-24, available at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/
pdf/EUFM_Esty.pdf.
22 “There is no single, generally agreed upon definition of project finance.  A recent
article in the Wall Street Journal illustrates the confusion that surrounds the defi-
nition. The article defined project finance as, ‘a term that typically refers to money
lent to build power plants or oil refineries.’” Id. at 213 n.1.
23 Id. at 213.
24 ANDREW FIGHT, INTRODUCTION TO PROJECT FINANCE 10 (Elsevier Linacre House
ed., 2006).
25 Id. at 3-5.
26 BENJAMIN ETSY, MODERN PROJECT FINANCE 25 (John Wiley & Sons 2004).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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gally independent entity, “the debt can be structured without recourse
to the sponsors.”32  Legal independence is important in other ways as
well.  Specifically, capital providers may assess a project’s cash flows
and assets.  This assessment may be made independent of concerns
regarding a sponsor’s financial wellbeing or pre-existing claims on the
assets of that sponsor.33  Historically, private firms have only used PF
to finance industrial projects such as mines, pipelines, and oil fields;
but more recently, many private firms are becoming more involved in
PF and are readily utilizing it to finance infrastructure projects in re-
gions like the Maghreb and Middle East by providing greater access to
mines, oil, gas, and other natural resources in those areas.34
According to the World Bank, the need for successful infra-
structure investment and development in Asia and the MENA regions
alone is “enormous.”35  Africa and the MENA region only receive a
very small share of investment in its infrastructure from the outside
due to difficulty in getting funding, low creditworthiness, limits on the
local financial markets, its banks, and local currencies, and to the high
risk profiles typical of infrastructure projects.36  Whether the region
will be able to attract foreign currency funds will depend highly on the
ability to reduce foreign exchange risks, and reduce the risks/con-
straints associated with PF in the region.37  One of the main con-
straints includes limited access to non-recourse debt, which actually
damages an economy’s ability to attract private investment in infra-
structure because project sponsors are usually reluctant to finance in-
frastructure with equity only, or take the project’s debts fully on their
balance sheets.38  Therefore, many such development projects never
get underway. More importantly, the local infrastructure remains an-
32 Id.
33 Id.; see also THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994: INFRA-
STRUCTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT (Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
34 Infrastructure includes investments in water, transportation, electricity, natu-
ral gas, clean energy, and telecommunications. See John W. Kesinger & John D.
Martin, Project Finance: Raising Money the Old-Fashioned Way, 3 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 69 (1988); see also DAVID EITMANN, ARTHUR STONEHILL, & MICHAEL
MOFFETT, MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS FINANCE (Denise Clinton et al. eds., 8th ed.
1998).
35 Boey Yin, Reality Bites-A Quieter PF Horizon, PFI ASIA PACIFIC REV. 2-3 (1998),
http://www.pfie.com/reality-bites-a-quieter-pf-horizon/364187.article.
36 See Robert Sheppard, Stephen von Klaudy & Geeta Kumar, Financing Infra-
structure in Africa, in GRIDLINES: NOTE NO. 13 (2006), http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/
sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/Gridlines-13-Financing%20Infrastructure%20in%
20Africa%20-%20RSheppard%20SvKlaudy%20GKumar.pdf.
37 See generally PRISCILLA AHMED, PROJECT FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(Int’l Finance Corp. 1999).
38 See Sheppard et al., supra note 36 (discussing how the region can attract more
project finance and its key constraints).
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tiquated, and in some cases, non-existent.  Even efforts to raise PF
funds in capital markets via project bonds prove to be unsuccessful due
primarily to the region’s well-known devaluating currency issues.39
Three main factors limit the MENA region’s ability to tap into
foreign and local currency markets in its efforts to raise funds for in-
frastructure development projects, especially the long-term debt fi-
nance.40  First, most African countries have low sovereign credit
ratings, making foreign commercial lending difficult to come by, and
even if accessed, it is only for short-term financing transactions.41  One
way to improve this is to have local projects export their “end product”
(i.e. - whether it be gas, oil, water, clean energy, etc.) so that a project
may mitigate debt repayment risks through the use of foreign curren-
cies it generates.42  Exportation to Asia, Europe, and other developed
areas is key, as it ensures the ability to tap into more sophisticated
financial markets, thus attracting investment.43  “Second, most local
markets have limited capacity to finance infrastructure projects,” due
to inferior domestic bank structures that do not permit long-term fi-
nancing, and if they do, they often need to obtain guarantees from offi-
cial agencies to attract local currency debt.44  They “have longer pay-
back and build-out periods” and tend to be more susceptible to unsta-
ble political and legal institutions, and to regulatory interference.45
Many of the past ruling regimes in the area also had a strong
bias against projects that involved little regulatory intervention, or to
those with U.S. dollar revenues, such as export-oriented ports, rail-
ways, and gas pipelines.46  Their greed created serious regulatory
risks to outsiders seeking to invest in those markets, and a quick trip
throughout the region demonstrates the major need for the railways,
modern roadways, ports and pipelines that would permit access to the
regions valuable resources for resale and profit.  Those significant
profits could in turn be invested into infrastructure, in partnership
with those nations that the MENA region could export to; creating
what could become one the most advanced infrastructure systems in
the world.  Local banks must demonstrate that they are able finance
39 HENRY A. DAVIS, PROJECT FINANCE: PRACTICAL CASE STUDIES (1996).
40 See Sheppard et al., supra note 36, at 13.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Farida Mazhar, Reform, Private Capital Needed to Develop Infrastructure in
Africa: Problems and Prospects for Private Participation, in GRIDLINES NO. 8
(2005).
44 Sheppard et al., supra note 36, at 2 (explaining how virtually all infrastructure
projects undertaken by African countries need credit enhancements to attract lo-
cal currency financing).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 3.
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long-term debt and themselves, so that outside investors will have con-
fidence in their stability and in depositing foreign currencies into the
region via long-term PF loans.47
Pension reforms are key to improving the local capital market
structures, and to improve the availability of loans and funds for infra-
structure development and PF.  Pension reform could increase local
savings and transform pension funds into investment funds for infra-
structure projects by allowing governments to begin to offer long-term
fixed rate debt—a key element in being able to provide local currency
financing to projects in the region.48  In time, local capital markets
would develop, moving away from local full-guarantee bond issuances,
to being able to finance most of the region’s new infrastructure financ-
ing needs via the creation of investments funds, eliminating the heavy
risk mitigation associated with guarantees that actually work to deter
outside investment.49
The MENA region may become a major international center of
economic development if it successfully transitions to democracy.50
The mainly young population that spurred the uprisings witnessed in
the Arab Spring of 2011 is due to increase by more than 60 percent by
2050, creating a gross MENA population of around 690 million peo-
ple.51  That growth increase will require a major investment in new
infrastructure.52  The region has ageing assets as well, and the popula-
tion is moving rapidly into new areas with key asset sectors such as
utilities, transport, and social infrastructure.53  An estimated 500 Bil-
lion is to be spent in the MENA region by 2020 on infrastructure devel-
opment via use of the Public Private Partnership (“PPP”) model as a
47 THE WORLD BANK, INFRASTRUCTURE AT THE CROSSROADS: LESSONS FROM 20
YEARS OF WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE (2006), http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/EXT/
epic.nsf/ImportDocs/F4431415FD5E1A738525739F00788A59?opendocument&
query=CO.
48 Id. at 2.
49 Id. See generally Emmanuel Nyirinkinda, The Uganda Distribution Concession
(2005), http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Fi-
nancing%20Africa%20Through%20the%20Crisis%20and%20Beyond.pdf  (discuss-
ing Africa in relation to the reforms referenced above).
50 Abraham Akkawi, Head of Infrastructure and PPP Advisory Serv. Middle East,
Address at the MENA Regional Conference on Infrastructure Reform and Regula-
tions: Developing the Financial Capital Market to Raise Adequate Levels of Infra-
structure Financing 3 (Dec. 7, 2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT
MENA/Resources/Akkawi_MNAReg.Conference2009.pdf.
51 Id.; Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi & Mary Kent, Challenges and Opportunities: The
Population of the Middle East and North Africa, 62 POPULATION REFERENCE BU-
REAU, No. 2, at 5 fig. 2 (2007).
52 Akkawai, supra note 50.
53 Id. at 4.
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firmly established project delivery technique.54  Future project pipe-
lines include investments of over 500 Billion USD from the UAE,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar in oil, gas, clean energy, power utili-
ties, transport, water and tourism-related projects alone.55  The scale
of those investments requires a larger pool of lenders due to a lack of
investment-grade bond funding.56 The necessary national legal frame-
work needs to be re-developed into new democratic-based institutions
to attract outside investment and assure market confidence.57  Politi-
cal issues, foreign exchange rates, and country risk profiles are also
constraints at the forefront, as the region’s varied political forces all
fight for prominence during this transitory period of political, legal,
social, and institutional change.58
The use of the PPP model for projects in the region is a wel-
come solution for access to long-term financing (equity and debt).59 De-
mand for over $100 Billion USD in investments exists for
infrastructure PPP projects over the next several years.60  PPP’s can
be an alternative way of funding projects by introducing private fi-
nance to public sector projects.61  Thus, the public sector would define
and buy a service (as opposed to an asset), and the private sector would
deliver that service (and any necessary assets).62  The PPP structure
consists of creating an independent business financed and operated by
the private sector.63  The asset is created and then the service is deliv-
ered to the public sector client, in exchange for payment warranted by
the level of service provided.64
In the immediate future, the MENA PF model should consist of
a “no payment until the asset is complete and available for use” ap-
proach.  This model shifts the risk of cost and time overruns to the
private sector until it is later shared with the government.65  New and
poorly funded governments and related project institutions may de-
velop as a result of the recent turmoil, and they will be unstable in the
beginning. Therefore, risk must be alleviated if the region is to prosper
and rebuild.  Said infrastructure projects should fix their costs to the
54 Roudi-Fahimi & Kent, supra note 51.
55 Akkawai, supra note 50, at 5.
56 Id. at 8.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 9.
60 Dylan Bowman, Region needs $100bn of PPP investment over next five years,
ARABIANBUSINESS.COM (Nov. 2, 2008).
61 Akkawi, supra note 50, at 10.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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government at the financial close of such projects, and for the length of
any granted concessions.66  This allows development of the region’s fi-
nancial and capital markets, as the demand that rests with govern-
ment bodies and supply is enhanced by investment from banks,
pension funds (as described above), infrastructure funds, outside sov-
ereign wealth funds, and development funds.67
On the supply side, limits on investment bank involvement are
largely due to the region’s recent credit shortage.68  Long-term financ-
ing remains an issue as well, as investment banks usually handle the
debt portion under a PF structure, a typical financing structure in the
early project developmental phase.69  Notable limitations and con-
straints in the use of pension funds also exist because their governance
rules often limit direct investment and lending of any borrowed funds.
Equity houses usually have superiority in this area of finance. Pension
funds could be utilized, however, to replace senior lenders and equity
investors during refinance stages.  Infrastructure funds are also strug-
gling to raise cash, and are definitely more cautious lately, due to the
recent uprisings. They are decreasing individual investment amounts.
This could be due to fear of expropriation in the affected areas; a possi-
bility further analyzed in the MENA region possible solutions sections
of this note.
With the rise in commodity prices, however, (due mainly to the
recent uprisings in the region), there are also positives such an in-
creased cash flow to sovereign wealth funds. These may in turn be uti-
lized as equity investment vehicles for infrastructure projects in the
region.  But this is often limited by national government protectionism
and preference for commodity-only investments, rather than growing
areas like infrastructure projects that benefit the community (i.e. -
clinics, social programs, clean energy, and electricity or water
projects). Although, as discussed below, some sovereigns are intently
seizing the region’s growth opportunities and moving towards diversi-
fying their wealth fund investment portfolios into some of the afore-
mentioned clean and renewable energy projects.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Andrew England, Credit Shortage Blamed for Slow Growth, FIN. TIMES (May
31, 2010, 4:58 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b0a0a7d0-6cc5-11df-91c8-00144
feab49a.html#axzz1ZHUZGUzo.
69 Rajeev L. Sawant, The Economies of Large-Scale Infrastructure FDI: the Case of
Project Finance, J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 1036, 1037 (2010), available at http://www.
palgrave-journals.com/jibs/journal/v41/n6/pdf/jibs200963a.pdf; see also Taking the
Infrastructure Agenda Forward in the Middle East and North Africa, THE WORLD
BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/UY6Y3FLP00 (discussing the issues addressed in
the MENA Regional Conference on Infrastructure Reform and Regulation in De-
cember 2009) (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
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There are also constraints and limitations on development
funds like the IBRD, World Bank, EBRD, UN Development Pro-
gramme, African Development Bank, EIB, and the Asian Development
bank. This is mainly due to their sector-specific criteria, geographic
area criteria, requirements that funding made available only for spe-
cific outcomes, and insistence upon sovereign guarantees.  They do not
always match all funding and usually finance projects from markets
rather than from their own resources. This adversely limits the
Maghreb region, which has inferior markets and an inability to raise
sufficient capital for mega-projects as stated above.  On the demand
side, an obvious need for the development of legal framework exists so
as to underpin private finance. A great demand for power, water, oil,
gas, and renewable energy projects also exists in the MENA region,
with most governments already displaying their “open for business
signs.”70
The MENA region’s current status, with regard to unity, chal-
lenges, and constraints are further evidenced by the recent politically
motivated “change” of events associated with the Arab Spring of
2011.71 The Arab people continue to aggressively demonstrate that
they want equality, democracy, prosperity, and better public services,
including more efficient and better-designed infrastructure.72  At the
same time, government budgets are still under heavy pressure in the
region, and the private sector perceives the risk of political upheavals
as extremely dangerous to any PF investment.73  As a result, it has
become harder to finance any necessary infrastructure project in the
region.  While most people have access to public services, the quality
and reliability of services is a real challenge that constrains competi-
tiveness, regional economic activities, and growth prospects.74  Add to
this one of the world’s largest youth populations, and clearly infra-
structure becomes both a need and a tremendous opportunity for creat-
ing jobs, and also for driving the region’s prosperity and productivity.75
70 See generally Akkawi, supra note 50 (referencing the topic of defining project
finance, its limitations, and its key constraints in the MENA region).
71 Mehran Kamrava, The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution, 56
ORBIS 96, 96-104 (2011).
72 Erin Snider & David Faris, The Arab Spring: U.S. Democracy Promotion in
Egypt, 18 MIDDLE E. POL’Y, 49-62 (2011).
73 Michael Ross, Nimah Mazaheri & K. Kaiser, The Resource Curse in MENA?
Political Transitions, Resource Wealth, Economic Shocks, and Conflict Risk (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5742, 2011).
74 Uri Dadush & Michele Dunne, American and European Responses to the Arab
Spring: What’s the Big Idea?, 34 WASH. Q. 131-45 (2011).
75 See generally Rina Bhattacharya & Hirut Wolde, Constraints on Growth in the
MENA Region (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/31, 2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1031.pdf.
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Arab countries in the MENA region have been spending
around 5 percent GDP per annum on infrastructure, whereas other
developing countries like China have a comparative advantage in
spending up to 15 percent GDP per annum.76  Arab countries need to
double their spending in infrastructure to 10 percent GDP per annum
(the equivalent to $75-100 Billion USD) to sustain the growth rates
that have been achieved in recent years and to boost economic compet-
itiveness.77  The importance of leveraging the private sector also comes
into play as it adds value to PPP with the right risk allocation.78
PPP’s are crucial vehicles for the region’s Arab countries to keep pace
with their infrastructure needs and to ensure growth.79  Involving the
private sector in infrastructure development can be a cost-effective so-
lution, and as alluded before, result in economic growth and recovery,
and spur much needed job creation, both inside and outside the
region.80
III. CURRENT SITUATION, SELECT PROJECTS, KEY AREAS
OF OPPORTUNITY
1. Tunisia
Once known as the “Switzerland” of North Africa,81 Tunisia
was always one of the more stable areas in the region.  It traditionally
has had great success in attracting FDI and local project investment in
areas of infrastructure development, power projects, social projects, as
well as stable banking and tourism sector investment.82  Tunisia, how-
76 Taking the Infrastructure Agenda Forward in the Middle East and North Af-
rica (Dec. 7-8, 2009) (unpublished summary of conference, on file with the Rich-
mond Journal of Global Law and Business), available at http://siteresources.world
bank.org/INTMENA/Resources/MENAInfr.Reg.Forum_ConferenceProceedings.
pdf.
77 Id. at 9.
78 See id. at 23.
79 See id. at 9.
80 See generally World Bank and Partners Join Efforts to Tackle Arab World Infra-
structure Challenge, ARAB WORLD INITIATIVE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://arabworld.
worldbank.org/content/awi/en/home.html (addressing the challenges and con-
straints to project finance and to infrastructure projects in the MENA region in
general).
81 REBECCA HILLAUER, THE HISTORY OF THE CAMERA AND THE VEIL, ENCYCLOPAE-
DIA OF ARAB WOMEN FILM-MAKERS 22 (2005); Alison James, Rome Rebuilt in Tuni-
sia, VARIETY (2002), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117872554.
82 See STEVE ONYEIWU, ANALYSIS OF FDI FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: IS THE
MENA REGION DIFFERENT? 4, 6, 12 (2003), http://www.mafhoum.com/press6/172E
11.pdf; Tunisia Welcomes FDI with Open Arms, FEMISE (June 1, 2011), http://
www.femise.org/en/2011/01/discussions/tunisie-terre-d%E2%80%99accueil-des-
ide/.
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ever, was the first Arab nation in the MENA region to protest and oust
its long-standing dictatorial regime, headed by former President Zine
Al-Bidine Ben Ali, in what became known as the “Jasmine Revolu-
tion.”83  A forerunner to larger demonstrations, on December 17, 2010,
a Tunisian man set himself on fire in the capital city of Tunis because
of low employment.84  Through December and January, major protests
spread to capital and dozens of deaths resulted from a violent govern-
ment crackdown.85  The government appealed for tranquillity to no
avail, and in early January 2011, it attempted to appease the swell of
uprisings by sacking its Interior Minister and promising political and
legal reforms.86  This also failed to pacify protestors, and the uprisings
became more violent, leading eventually to President Ben Ali promis-
ing to step down by 2014.87 Shortly thereafter, Ben Ali’s fled to Saudi
Arabia with his family and billions of dollars in Tunisian assets.88  The
new Tunisian regime subsequently sought extradition to prosecute the
former President and his family for human rights violations and mis-
use of State funds.89  Since then, the new government has made
strides on its promises of reform and better infrastructure.90  The most
promising infrastructure projects proposed in Tunisia at this time (and
since the Arab Spring) are those in the Independent Power Producer
(“IPP”) sector.91
With the demand for electricity rising annually, Tunisia has
embarked on an aggressive programme to increase its electric and
clean energy production capacity, focusing on the development of com-
bined cycle gas turbine (“CCGT”) facilities, and seeking PPP projects
in partnership with its gas and electric company, “Socie´te´ Tunisienne
83 Arab Revolt: Tunisia’s Stolen Revolution?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2011), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12629758.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Tunisia Protests: President Sacks Interior Minister, BBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2011,
11:45 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12171183.
87 Tunisia Leader to Step Down in 2014, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/tunisia-leader-to-step-down-
in-2014-15053429.html#.
88 Anthony Shadid, Joy as Tunisian President Flees Offers Lesson to Arab Lead-
ers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/world/africa/
15region.html?ref=zineelabidinebenali.
89 Tunisia Seeks Ben Ali’s Extradition, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/02/20/tunisia-benali-idUSLDE71J0LQ20110220.
90 See, e.g., Rachelle Younglai, Tunisia Financial System Stabilizing – Central
Banker, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/22/imf-
tunisia-idUSS1E78K29420110922 (asserting that Tunisia’s financial system is
stabilizing).
91 Hisham Katib, Power generation in the Middle East: can the boom continue?, in
MIDDLE E. ECON. SURVEY 46 (2007).
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de l’Electricite´ et du Gaz” (“STEG”).92  The government has reportedly
set itself the objective of establishing three new combined cycle plants
at Ghannouch (by way of expanding the existing facility), Sousse, and
in Bizerte, and a fourth combined cycle plant at Cap Bon, which will be
used for both domestic and export needs.93  The first of Tunisia’s new
projects at Ghannouch is already under construction.94  The projects at
Sousse, Bizerte, and Cap Bon should ensue each year from 2012 to
2015.95 The upcoming projects in Tunisia, such as the Bizerte IPP pro-
ject, consist of a proposed 350-500MW plant which is being tendered
by the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Small and Medium Enter-
prises on a build, own, and operate basis (“BOO”), on a 20 year conces-
sion.96  The Ministry has reportedly already received 17 expressions of
interest.97 Five or six companies have been short listed, and the bid
date has not even been announced yet publicly; but the Ministry is
reportedly seeking to select a preferred bidder by year-end. Financial
close was targeted for May 2011 but that has been delayed until the
end of the year due to the recent turmoil across the region.98  The new
plant is scheduled to become operational in the second quarter of
2014,99 and is an excellent opportunity to revive this nation’s economy.
The upcoming El Med/Cap Bon IPP project is also an interest-
ing area for opportunity, as a tender is being prepared for a 1,200MW
power plant in Al-Haouaria that will both supply the local market in
Tunisia and export power to Italy; an ideal and vital export scenario,
as detailed above.100  STEG and Italian grid operator Terna agreed in
June 2007 to carry out joint studies for the facility. Under their agree-
ment, up to 800MW of power would be exported to Italy from 2015 via
a 200 kilometer subsea transmission line. The other 400MW will be
92 Ulrich Laumanns, Regional Workshop on CDM PoA’s, Utilization of Wind En-
ergy by Large Industrial Companies in Tunisia 300-03 (Jan. 26-27, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.jiko-bmu.de/files/basisinformationen/application/force-download/
poa_workshop_tunis_presentations.pdf.
93 Andrea Pinna, European Investment Bank, Regional Workshop on CDM PoA’s
The Role of Project Mechanisms in the Southern & Eastern Mediterranean: Views
from the European Investment Bank 300 (Jan. 26-27, 2010), available at http://
www.jiko-bmu.de/files/basisinformationen/application/force-download/poa_work
shop_tunis_presentations.pdf.
94 Laumanns, supra note 92.
95 Id.
96 IN-MED & ASEM, INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TUNISIAN AND EGYPTIAN
ENERGY SECTORS 38 (2011), http://www.invest-in-med.eu/en/agenda/operation_485
_medenergy_study_ve_2011_def-9_ms.pdf.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 37.
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used to supply the local market.101  STEG will buy the domestic power
produced by the plant under a 20-year power purchase agreement.102
In addition to the power produced by the plant, the related cable facili-
ties could export up to 200MW of electricity generated by the project to
neighbouring MENA countries or to cross-sea areas such as Europe.
In Sousse, STEG is also seeking bids for a 380MW- 450MW turnkey
combined cycle and “single shaft” power plant, to supply the industrial
sector.  The project is scheduled to come on-stream in the first quarter
of 2013, and STEG will reportedly finance the scheme itself, with the
successful bidder taking-on a 12-year operations and maintenance
(“O&M”) contract.103
There are also new and interesting gas-supply developments in
Tunisia that should lead to increased natural gas and renewable en-
ergy PF projects.  In May 2009, PERENCO, an independent Anglo-
French oil and gas company started pumping gas through a new 73
kilometer pipeline connecting the El-Franig and Baguel fields directly
to the national grid.104  Gas production from the Hsadrubal field, a
joint venture by British Gas Tunisia Limited (“BGT”) and Enterprise
Tunisienne D’Activite´s Pe´trolie`res (“ETAP”), began in 2009.105  Opera-
tion of this plant made British Gas (“BG”) the largest gas producer in
Tunisia.106  Finally, additional gas is expected from an offshore oil
field development in the Gulf of Hammamet, operated by ENI, a large
Italian multi-national oil and gas company present in 70 countries and
currently Italy’s largest industrial company.107  “Tunisia is also seek-
ing ways to substantially increase its gas production in the south of
the country.”108  “At present, there is no way to transport the gas in
the south, to population centers in the center and north, and therefore
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id at 37.
104 Perenco Inaugurates LOOP Project at CPF in Matmata, Tunisia, ENERGY BUS.
REV.: DRILLING AND PRODUCTION (May 13, 2009), http://drillingandproduction.en-
ergy-business-review.com/news/perenco_inaugurates_loop_project_at_cpf_in_
matamata_tunisia_090513.
105 Hasdrubal Gas Processing Plant, HYDROCARBONS-TECHNOLOGY.COM, http://
www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/hasdrubal (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
106 Tunisia, BG GROUP, http://www.bg-group.com/OurBusiness/WhereWeOperate/
Pages/pgTunisia.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
107 In Tunis Eni’s CEO Paolo Scaroni met with Tunisia’s Prime Minister Monsieur
Mohamed Ghannouchi and Tunisia’s Minister of Industry, ENI, http://www.eni.
com/en_IT/media/notes/2008-01-04-in-Tunis-CEO-Scaroni-met-Prime-Minister-
Ghannouchi.shtml (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) [hereinafter ENI].
108 Charles Whitney, Spotlight on the Tunisian Power Market, NORTON ROSE LLP
(2009), http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/23144/spotlight-on-
the-tunisian-power-market.
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the government is planning a new 320 kilometer pipeline connecting a
gas-gathering facility in the south with existing facilities in the north,
also with a new liquefied gas terminal.”109  The pipeline is expected to
be used for both domestic consumption and export, and would be devel-
oped by the Tunisian national oil company, “Enterprise Tunisienne
d’Activitie´s Pe´trolie`res” (“ETAP”),110 and three international oil com-
panies are to be determined via the bidding and award process.111 The
Ministry of Industry, Energy and Small and Medium Enterprises is
expected to make a final investment decision soon, launching EPC ten-
ders by early 2012, and according to the current schedule, construction
should be completed by the end of 2014.112  “How ETAP will finance its
share of the pipeline is currently under review.”113  “Negotiations are
also under way between Tunisia and the Algerian national oil com-
pany, Sonatrach on an agreement which would allow Tunisia to use
capacity in the Algerian Trans Med pipeline.”114  “The 20-year-old
pipeline transports Algerian natural gas to Sicily, crossing the Medi-
terranean Sea from Cap Bon.”115  Tunisia receives royalties from the
pipeline as payment for access through its territory.116
Investors in IPP’s should also be aware of legal and commercial
issues, such as Tunisia’s privatization program.  Tunisia has priva-
tized and/or restructured over 200 enterprises since the start of its
privatization program in 1987.117  The new Tunisian government ex-
pects the privatization programme to enter into a new accelerated
phase with the aim of improving the attractiveness of the Tunisian
economy to new foreign investors.118  The Tunisian Investment Code
also provides a broad range of fiscal incentives for foreign developers,
including tax relief on reinvested revenues and profits, exemptions on
value-added tax on imported capital goods, and depreciation schedules
109 Id.
110 ENI, supra note 107.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Tunisia Speeds up its Privatization Program, WASH. TIMES (July 10, 2000); see
also Tunisia Enters a New Era, PANGEA PARTNERS (1997), http://www.pangaea
partners.com/tunpriv.htm.
118 THE GOVERNMENT OF TUNISIA, PRIVATIZATION IN TUNISIA, http://www.privatisa-
tion.gov.tn/www/en/doc.asp?mcat=1&mrub=50&msrub=13&dev=true (last visited
Oct. 31, 2011).
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for production equipment.119  Political risks must also be well-consid-
ered and allocated at this critical time in Tunisia’s development,
before any FDI is made into Tunisian projects, especially because of
the change that occurred in the government structure.  Yet, even these
changes have not adversely affected the general Tunisian business en-
vironment, as the environment is constantly improving.120
The new Tunisian government has also concluded many Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties (“BITS”),121 which offer added risk and dis-
pute resolution protections with approximately eighty-one countries.
In that regard, Tunisia’s Association Agreement with the EU, which
came into effect in 2008, is vital to investment protection from the EU
investors with the aim of creating a free trade zone between Tunisia
and EU member states.  Developers are advised, however, to check
whether a bilateral trade treaty is in place with their country of incor-
poration/domicile.  Lastly, investors must be aware that developers
and their bankers may be required to apply for the approval of the
Tunisian Central Bank in relation to several aspects of funding of a
PPP or IPP project-financing, including when funding any debt and
equity by offshore investors.  The Tunisian “dinar” is generally a con-
vertible currency, but Central Bank authorisation is needed for foreign
exchange transactions.122  In particular, developers should consider
whether Tunisian Central Bank approval would be required for repa-
triation of dividends to sponsors or payments of principal and interest
to offshore lenders, increases in the share capital of the project com-
pany following its formation, and for the sale or acquisition of shares
in the project company by a non-resident company.123
In what was called the “African Transport Deal of the Year” in
2008, Tunisia also boasted of its capability to realize major PPP
projects with a recent $605 million project-financing backed by the
IFC, where TAV of Turkey partnered with the Tunisian government
and created an SPV called “TAV Tunisie,” which will be the conces-
sionaire of two linked airport projects.  The project, with total costs of
119 Investment Incentives, FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY: FIPA-TUNIS.,
http://www.investintunisia.tn/site/en/article.php?id_article=789 (last visited Oct.
4, 2011).
120 Tunisia: Increase in Exports, Signs of Improvement, GLOBAL ARAB NETWORK,
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/2011061411063/Economics/tunisia-in-
crease-in-exports-signs-of-improvement.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
121 See generally Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties At-
tract FDI? Only a bit. . .and they could bite (World Bank Research Dept., Working
Paper No. 3121, 2003).
122 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: TUNISIA (2011), http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5439.htm.
123 See generally Whitney, supra note 108 (discussing Tunisia’s power market op-
portunities and associated risks).
2011] ARAB SPRING BRINGS WINDS OF CHANGE 95
approximately $1 Billion USD, is one the largest recent private sector
investments in Tunisia, and the first airport private sector concession
in the Maghreb region.124  The concession project owes much of its suc-
cess to the participation of the IFC, which not only helped provide
longer-term debt from the commercial banks, but also helped TAV re-
solve a number of legal hurdles while it attempted to get financial
close in its Tunisia deal.  The project consists of two linked conces-
sions, one for the design, building, financing and operation (“DBFO”)
of a new international airport at Enfidha (for an initial capacity of 7
million passengers), and the second for the operation and upgrade of
the existing Monastir International Airport (4.2 million passengers in
2006).125  The tender for the PPP project was originally launched in
2004 as a single “green-field” airport concession, and has expanded to
two linked concessions.126
In all of the projects the World Bank is involved in across the
MENA region, it is also important to note that it extends its support
via a growing network of civil society organizations, development prac-
titioners, and government agencies from across the MENA region, to
foster the exchange of ideas, build capacity, and help members learn
about participatory governance and social accountability mechanisms
that are vital to success in this developing region.  Active citizen par-
ticipation and social accountability on all sides is fully encouraged,
and Ms. Shamshad Akhtar, Vice President of the World Bank’s MENA
Region is quoted in this regard as stressing that: “Development can
only be strengthened if we are all partners in the effort.”127
2. Egypt
Known as a stable MENA nation and as a valuable strategic
partner of the United States and Israel, Egypt quickly followed in Tu-
nisia’s footsteps, ousting its dictator of thirty years, President Hosni
124 Summary of Proposed Investment, INT’L FIN. CORP. (Apr. 2008), http://www.ifc.
org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/0/9F0D31A0EFB9FC06852576BA000E2B83 (discussing
the TAV Tunisie Project).
125 Id.
126 See African Transport Deal of the Year 2008, PROJECT FIN. MAG. (Feb. 2009),
http://www.projectfinancemagazine.com/Article/2409597/African-Transport-Deal-
of-the-Year-2008.html.; see also Summary of Proposed Investment, INT’L FIN.
CORP. (Apr. 2008), http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/0/9F0D31A0EFB9FC0
6852576BA000E2B83 (discussing the TAV Tunisie Project).
127 Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Supports Social Accountability
Network across Arab World (Apr. 15, 2011), available at: http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/LEBANONEXTN/0,,content
MDK:22891131~menuPK:294909~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:29
4904,00.html.
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Mubarak.128  Egypt has since moved aggressively towards political
and constitutional reform.129  In January 2011, soon after the Tuni-
sian President fled to Saudi Arabia, protests began to rock Cairo’s now
famous Tahrir Square.130  It quickly became the headquarters and
principal site of Egypt’s revolution.131  Clashes between protesters, the
government, and its seemingly peaceful military forces continued until
early February, leading to the ruling party stepping down—including
the powerful sons of Egypt’s former President.132  On the eighteenth
day of protests, President Mubarak stepped down, exiling himself to
his private residence in Sharm el-Sheikh, a Red Sea resort town on the
eastern coast of Egypt.133  Currently, he and his sons are being prose-
cuted in Cairo for alleged corruption and misuse of state funds.134
Power or lack thereof, became the top agenda item in Middle
Eastern countries, including Egypt, this past summer when power
shortages increased due to the combination of high summer tempera-
tures and Ramadan occurring at the same time.135  Bidders for the
1,500MW Dairut independent power project (“IPP”), the first IPP in
Egypt for a decade, started to form a consortium.136  The Electricity &
Energy Ministry is offering to pay for the project, and Egyptian Elec-
tricity Transmission Company (“EETC”) will be supplying the power
under a 20-year power purchase agreement (“PPA”).137  “The scheme
will be a BOO plant.”138  The IFC is believed to be advising on the
project, since it has also been actively advising on PPPs.139  However,
unlike the PPPs above, the IPP project is likely to have currency guar-
antees to encourage international banks to fund the project.140  The
PPPs are likely to be funded by “ban teams” that are believed to have
128 Spreading Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/
middleeast/2011-spreading-revolutions.html#intro (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
129 Id.
130 Egypt Protests: Key Moments in Unrest, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2011, 11:57 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12425375.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 Id.; Sharm el-Sheikh, Mubarak’s New Home, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11,
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/sharm-el-sheikh-egypt-mubarak
_n_821913.html#s238655&title=Sharm_elSheikh_Tourists.
134 Iskandar El-Amrani, The Resumption of Hosni Mubarak’s Trial in Cairo, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2011, 12:35 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/
2011/sep/05/mubarak-trial-cairo-egypt.
135 Rob Morrison, PFI: Power Tops the Middle East Agenda, REUTERS (Sept. 14,
2010), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/09/14/idUKLDE68D18F20100914.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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formed between foreign and local companies that were shortlisted in
June of last year.141
With internationalized PPP projects such as these, it appears
that Egypt, like Tunisia, is looking at ways of creating power genera-
tion capacity more quickly. This seems to be one of the best areas of
opportunity for new PF related projects in the region at this time. Lo-
cal banks are also expected to play an important part in such PF deals
considering that the risks are lower than on a normal green-field IPPs
and PPPs, and the amounts required for financing are not too high.142
International banks could become involved in these projects, but they
should be aware of typical Egyptian withholding tax issues.143  The PF
schemes are however, long-term dollar financings, so international
banks could be required; and they should view this as an area for great
returns, via possible power exportation to Europe, GCC countries,
Asia, and beyond.144
Another interesting Egyptian PPP project that may lead to op-
portunity for FDI is the “EAgrium” petro-chemical and fertilizers pro-
ject.145  It was one of the largest and most expansive oil and gas deals
to be project-financed in Egypt, and the deal was completed with no
export credit agency or EIB support.146  The $1 billion debt was placed
in a mix of international and local banks.147  EAgrium was a joint ven-
ture between Canada’s Agrium (60%), state-owned companies Echem
and EGAS (24%), the national operator of the gas distribution grid
GASCO (9%), and Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation (Apicorp)
(7%).148  The project was to consist of a nitrogen facility located in
Damietta, scheduled for completion in 2010-2011,149 but disputes re-
lated to environmental concerns have cancelled it (at least momenta-
rily).150  This project could be awaiting “opportunity-sniffing” investors
from the international community to pounce upon the project, better
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See Structured Finance, COM. INT’L BANK (Oct. 6, 2011, 10:44 AM), http://www.
cibeg.com/en/InstitutionalBanking/StructuredFinance/Pages/default.aspx (dis-
cussing the EAgrium project’s award for the “Middle East Petrochemicals Deal of
The Year 2007” by Project Finance).
146 EAgrium: Fully Banked, PROJECT FIN. MAG. (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.project
financemagazine.com/Article/2412149/EAgrium-Fully-banked.html.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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150 Egypt Cancels Agrium Project, EDMONTON J. (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.ca-
nada.com/edmontonjournal/news/business/story.html?id=43442844-b819-48b0-
8479-ccd9a208be93.
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mitigate and allocate the environmental risks involved, and get it back
on its feet again as it appears creditworthy and bankable.151  In Au-
gust 2008, Agrium reportedly sold their stake in the project for 26 per-
cent share in the MISR Oil Processing Company (“MOPCO”). Under
the deal, EAgrium was to be a wholly owned subsidiary of MOPCO.152
In 2008, the Egyptian government decided to relocate the fertilizer
complex plant away from Damietta153 since it was to produce poten-
tially hazardous ammonia and urea that would cause environmental
concerns near the heavily populated capital city of Cairo.154  The origi-
nal projects contracts awarded were Engineering, Procurement, and
Construction (“EPC”) based contracts, and the project itself was to be
paid back on Lump Sum Turnkey (“LSTK”) payment terms.155  A dis-
pute between the Egyptian government and the Canadian fertilizer
producing company Agrium followed the project’s cancellation, but it
was quickly resolved, and EFG-Hermes, the Egypt-based private in-
vestment bank has stated that, “The relatively quick resolution of the
dispute should send a signal, from a regulatory and political risk
standpoint, that foreign investment environment in Egypt is still fa-
vourable.”156  New site selection, FDI, and a thorough environmental
study could be possible solutions to get the project back on its feet
again.
Water supply and sanitation in Egypt is an area for possibly
vast PF expansion, as it is characterized by urgent need (and along
with that need a host of achievements and challenges).  Among the
achievements in this sector are increases of piped water supply be-
tween 1990 and 2006 from 89 percent to 99 percent in urban areas,
and from 39 percent to 82 percent in rural areas.157  These improve-
151 Cf. EAgrium: Fully Banked, supra note 146 (describing EAgrium’s financing
history).
152 See, e.g., Agrium Reaches Agreement on Egyptian Nitrogen Facility, AGRIUM
(Aug. 11, 2008), http://www.agrium.com/news/05784_9078.jsp.
153 See, e.g., Egyptian Parliament Fails to Support EAgrium Project on Existing
Site, AGRIUM (June 20, 2008), http://www.agrium.com/news/05784_8886.jsp.
154 See Abdel-Rahman Hussein, Cairo Protest against Agrium Dispersed as Ex-
perts Condemn Plant, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (May 26, 2008), http://www.thedaily
newsegypt.com/archive/cairo-protest-against-agrium-dispersed-as-experts-con-
demn-plant-dp1.html.
155 Sharif Elmusa & Jeannie Sowers, Damietta Mobilizes for Its Environment, in
MIDDLE E. RESEARCH & INFO. PROJECT (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.merip.org/mero/
mero102109.
156 Heba Saleh, Egypt Resolves Project Dispute, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2008), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2b902e0e-68de-11dd-a4e5-0000779fd18c.html#axzz1L3MquR
N8.
157 Christine Haffner-Sifakis & Christoph Sommer, Horizon 2020- Elaboration of
a Mediterranean Hot Spot Investment Programme (MeHSIP), EUROPEAN INV. BANK
(Jan. 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/enviroment.enlarg/med/pdf/mehsip_report.pdf.
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ments are despite rapid population growth (with the elimination of
open defecation in rural areas during that same period), and in gen-
eral, with a relatively high level of investment in infrastructure during
that period.158 Access to improved water sources in Egypt is now prac-
tically universal.  On the institutional side, the separation between
regulation and service provision has been improved through the crea-
tion of a “National Holding Company for Water and Wastewater” in
2004, and of an economic regulator, the “Egyptian Water Regulatory
Agency” (“EWRA”), in 2006.159
Many challenges remain, however, in this area for Egypt,
which could be turned to PF opportunities.  Only about one third of the
population is connected to sanitary sewers.  Due to low sanitation cov-
erage, about 17,000 children die each year because of diarrhea.160
Low-cost water recovery, due to water tariffs that are among the low-
est in the world, are also a challenge and require government subsi-
dies to the country’s fourteen public water and sewer companies, even
for simple operating costs.161  Poor facilities operation, such as waste-
water treatment plants, is also a major issue, but it may be viewed by
eager investors as an area of opportunity for foreign investment and
partnership/participation.162  Foreign aid from the United States, the
European Union, France, Germany, the World Bank, and Arab donors
remains important in terms of financing and technical assistance.163
This is particularly important in the case of Western donors, who pro-
mote sector reform that aims at higher levels of cost recovery and more
efficient water service provision.164  Private sector participation in op-
erating water and sanitation systems has so far been limited, mainly
to Build-Operate-Transfer (“BOT”) arrangements for large facilities,
but PF for new projects is aggressively underway, and will hopefully
lead to success stories in this area for the region.165
One interesting Egyptian project in this sector, which may
likely open doors for many others, is the Gabal El-Asfar Waste-Water
Treatment Plant (“GAWWTP”) Project in Cairo.  This project received
approval in October 2009 from the Board of Directors of the African
Development Bank Group (“AfDB”) for C= 53 Million Euros in initial
project financing.166  The project’s objective is to “improve the quality
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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166 See generally Egypt: AfDB Approves C= 53 Million Loan to Finance Waste Water
Treatment Project, AFR. DEV. BANK GRP. (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.afdb.org/en/
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of waste-water discharged into the drainage system in Cairo East,
thereby contributing to improved sanitation and a cleaner environ-
ment for the nearly 8 million people living in the area.”167 The pro-
posed additional treatment capacity will serve an additional 2.5
million people.168  Other project beneficiaries include downstream vil-
lagers and those living along the system draining the effluent from the
plant into Lake Manzala.169  The project corresponds with the AfDB’s
2008-2012 Medium-Term Strategy, which highlights the AfDB’s focus
on infrastructure development and better governance in PF, promot-
ing a more robust private sector in the MENA region.170
3. Libya
After witnessing popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the
Libyans were a bit more hesitant to bring about their own. This ap-
pears to be a result of the Libyan people living in utmost fear and op-
pression for the past 42 years, under the iron-fist rule of their leader,
Colonel Muammar Gaddaffi. Gaddaffi was toppled and killed in Octo-
ber 2011, and his 42 year oppressive ruling was also removed.  Gad-
daffi’s regime had targeted its own people, and “kill[ed] innocent
civilians,” to stay in power.171  Many lives were lost but the Libyan
opposition forces, NATO, and Libyan rebels collaborated and captured
the capital city of Tripoli and other pro-Gaddaffi strongholds.172  These
efforts have led to a new leadership in Libya, now called the National
Transition Council (“NTC”). The NTC is preparing the country for its
first free elections under a democratic Parliamentary system, appar-
ently based on a Islamic law, with a promise to the Libyan people and
news-and-events/article/egypt-afdb-approves-eur-53-million-loan-to-finance-
waste-water-treatment-project-5160 (discussing the Egyptian water project and
other related initiatives).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Zuma tells Gaddaffi: Stop Killing Innocent Civilians, YA LIBNAN (Mar. 13,
2011), http://www.yalibnan.com/2011/03/13/zuma-tells-gaddafi-stop-killing-inno-
cent-civilians; see also Gaddaffi killed in hometown, Libya eyes future, REUTERS
(Oct. 21, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-libya-idUSTRE79F1FK
20111020.
172 Damien McElroy, Libya: Battle for Tripoli Turns Bloody as Gaddafi Holds Out
to the End, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 23, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8716884/Libya-battle-for-Tripoli-
turns-bloody-as-Gaddafi-holds-out-to-the-end.html.
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international community of respect for the rule of law and for human
rights.173
Libya presents itself as the most challenging situation in the
MENA region, but at the same time, also the best possible ‘hot-spot’ for
PF opportunity after the Gaddaffi regime’s fall. There will be major
legal, institutional, operational, and political issues to address, once
the country’s new Parliament is elected and its Constitution is drawn.
FDI and project investment from the outside world will quickly pre-
sent itself to Libyan projects in the oil, gas, clean energy, and natural
resources sectors, as is already occurring in its rebel-controlled and
resource-rich cities, such as Ras Lanuf, Mizrata, and Benghazi.174
These are places where some European nations and the United States
have quickly recognized the rebel leadership as legitimate, so as to be
the first players on the new mega-project scene in those cities.175
Notably, the first international project-financing in Libya was
reported in 2007, when ABC International Bank Plc and Standard
Bank Plc jointly arranged $16 Million USD financing for the redevel-
opment and expansion of the historic Al-Waddan Hotel in Tripoli.176
The project sponsors provided a debt service undertaking with both
onshore and offshore security over the project’s assets.177  The Libyan
economy however, predominantly depends on revenues from petro-
leum so internal projects such as this were usually frowned upon,
mainly due to the closed anti-tourism society that had been created
under the Gaddaffi regime.  It is reported that strong diversification
efforts are being sought, however, with clean energy projects and tour-
ism as prime examples of opportunity in the non-oil sector.178  Despite
tourists not being allowed into the country under the former 2003 UN
sanctions, the tourism industry is now growing and likely to become
an attractive option for foreign investors.179
Abu Dhabi’s Al-Maskari Holding is funding a new $3 Billion
USD project to build an integrated “energy hub” in Libya and to de-
173 See A Vision of a Democratic Libya, NAT’L TRANSITION COUNCIL (Oct. 2011),
http://www.ntclibya.org/english/libya/.
174 See generally Sami Zaptia, Libya Launches $54 billion ‘Energy Cities’ Master
Plan, THE TRIPOLI POST (Jan. 11, 2010), http://tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=2
&i=5046.
175 See Mary E. Stonaker, What Formal Recognition Given to Libyan Rebels
Means for the Oil Markets, AL ARABIYA NEWS (July 15, 2011), http://www.
alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/15/157799.html.
176 See First-ever International Project Financing Funds in Libya, WHITE & CASE
LLP (Oct. 13, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://www.whitecase.com/press_10262007/.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. (quoting White & Case partner Jason Kerr).
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velop an underwater cable for exporting electricity to Europe.180  The
project will include solar power and conventional electricity generation
from fuels such as natural gas, and a high-voltage undersea transmis-
sion line from Libya to southern Italy.181  An agreement for the project
was signed in Tripoli on December 12, 2010, according to the Libyan
General Board of Privatization and Investment.182  Libya is proving to
be an immense resource for solar projects and other clean energy
projects that can be easily exported to Europe.183  The Al-Maskari pro-
ject’s goals are to compete with Russia and cover any European gas
shortages by sending Libya’s clean energy to Europe via cables under
the sea; these cables extend from northern Libya to southern Eu-
rope.184  Sheikha Aisha Al-Maskari, the chairwoman of Al-Maskari
Holding, said the group was interested in investing in all sectors of
Libya’s energy industry, including solar energy; she asserted that
Libya has “the best solar resources in the world.”185
Other upcoming projects in Libya that present new areas of op-
portunity are, of course, in the oil and gas sector.  Libya, a member of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”), is the
fourth largest oil producer in Africa after Nigeria, Algeria, and Angola
(with nearly 1.8 million barrels per day and has reserves estimated at
42 billion barrels).186  Projects in infrastructure development and con-
struction sectors are also successfully underway,187 and will probably
increase after the current civil-war-like conflict areas settle.  Opti-
mism is driving Libya’s construction sector as well, with 2011 and
2012 expected to present the strongest growth.188  Despite an optimis-
tic outlook, there are still a number of risks for investors to consider,
stemming predominantly from the business environment.189  The ma-
jor barrier to growth in Libya is related to Libya’s own business envi-
ronment, which has long been unpredictable and in desperate need of
reform.190  Libya scores 45.7 out of 100 for risks in BMI’s infrastruc-
180 See Tasmin Carlisle, Al Maskari Holding in $3bn Libya Energy Plan, THE
NAT’L (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/al-maskari-hold-
ing-in-3bn-libya-energy-plan.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See id.
185 Id.
186 Libya: Fourth Largest Oil Producer in Africa, ENNAHAR ONLINE (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.ennaharonline.com/en/economy/5839.html.
187 BUS. MONITOR INT’L, LIBYA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT 2011 (2011), http://www.
businessmonitor.com/infra/libya.html.
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189 Id.
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ture business environment scale, however, a rewards score of 53.2
from the same review scale reflects the tremendous opportunities for
PF investors.191
The UN lifting of sanctions in 2003 increased investor interest
in Libya, and the government has since actively pursued international
private investment.192  Any new government must offer the same sta-
bility and security to an investor as the Gaddaffi regime to ensure fu-
ture growth. But, arbitrary decision-making and non-transparent
investment laws may make this difficult.193 Libya “is ranked the worst
in North Africa according to Transparency International’s 2010 Cor-
ruptions Perception Index (coming in at 146 out of 178 states rated),
while the World Economic Forum placed the country at 100 out of 139
economies in terms of competitiveness.”194  The government’s recent
liberalization of the economy is movement in the right direction, but
current unrest may slow progress.195  The business environment may
remain, at least for the next six months to one year, the primary risk
to any positive forecast.196  But once the fighting ceases, this author
predicts that outside investment will flourish into Libya.  Investors
will come just to get at the nation’s oil, gas, and clean energy re-
sources. Not to mention that Libya’s ancient Mediterranean sea-resort
areas and coastlines are developable and attractive tourism pros-
pects.197  In fact, the Marriott Hotels Corporation, and the new MENA
regional offices of IATA have made efforts to gain an initial foothold in
Libya.198
Abu Dhabi financial services company Invest AD has also
launched a Libyan investment fund.  Invest AD has already committed
its own capital to the fund, which will invest in Libya’s $2.2 billion in
the stock market, as well as participating in initial public offerings
(“IPO”), and taking pre-IPO stakes in companies.199  “Libya has taken
positive steps to open its economy and is reaping the rewards, with
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 See generally Libya Offers Incredible Opportunity – But Only the Bold Need
Apply, LIBYANINVESTMENT.COM (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.libyaninvestment.com/
libya-news/8193.html.
198 Alexandra Berzon, Marriott Taps Mideast, Africa Chief, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702037919045766071333236
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very high rates of economic growth,” said Invest AD Chief Executive
Officer Nazem Fawwaz Al-Kudsi.200 Al-Kudsi further noted the firm
was “glad to be [in Libya] at an early stage of this process, and [that
Invest AD is] very much [a] long-term investor. This fund will contrib-
ute capital to some of the country’s most promising businesses to help
them grow for years to come.”201 The risk is that this optimism may
vanish with the onset of war in Libya.  With the end of conflict, inves-
tor confidence and financing opportunities in infrastructure develop-
ment, renewable energy exportation, and solar and fuel-related
projects may yet be restored.
Perhaps the most interesting and important of all possible new
developments in Libya, and for the MENA region as a whole, is Italy’s
proposed Libyan Motorway project.202 The project will act as a founda-
tional first project that will bring greater connectivity and greater ac-
cessibility throughout the region, permit increased future trade and
commerce throughout the area, and foster subsequent PF projects in
general once connected.  The $5 Billion USD cross-country motorway
project that is to be constructed for Libya by the Italian government,
will stretch from the Libya’s border with Tunisia to Libya’s border
with Egypt.203  Italian firms have presented twenty different plans for
the 1,700 kilometer motorway across Libya, which Italy’s Infrastruc-
ture Minister, Altero Matteoli, says is “the biggest project of its kind in
Africa.”204  Italy will finance the project according to the terms of a
friendship treaty signed by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2008.205  Building of the mo-
torway will be awarded to three different firms, which will divide the
work between them.206 Italy will invest $5 billion in Libya over the
next twenty years under the terms of the treaty, primarily in infra-
structure projects reserved exclusively to Italian firms, as the scheme
is designed to compensate Libya for Italy’s colonial misdeeds in the
first half of the twentieth-century.207  The two largest builders in Italy
filed for pre-qualification to bid for the new motorway project connect-
200 Abu Dhabi Invest AD launches Libya Fund to Tap High Growth, AME-INFO
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.ameinfo.com/254206.html.
201 Id.
202 Gulliver Cragg, Berlusconi and Gaddafi launch Libya motorway project,
FRANCE 24 (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.france24.com/en/20090831-berlusconi-gad-
dafi-launch-libya-motorway-project.
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new motorway and its financing).
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ing Tunisia and Egypt.208  The road, expected to span four lanes, will
span from Ras Ajdir, on the border with Tunisia, to Imsaad, close to
Egypt.209
A recent change of strategy by the Italian government has seen
it turn its back on its Libyan “friends” from the former Gaddaffi re-
gime, when Italy joined the NATO-led bombing campaign.210  The
campaign sought to enforce a UN resolution on the protection of civil-
ians in Libya, who were targeted by pro-Gaddaffi forces during the
conflict.211  Additionally, Gazprom, a Russian oil giant, also intends to
become involved in Libya by joining with the Italian oil company ENI
in its “Elephant Oil” projects in Libya.212
Another major but risky development in new Libyan housing
infrastructure projects are those managed by the U.S. project manage-
ment company AECOM, which already has a large American expatri-
ate presence in Libya.  AECOM recently signed a contract for a joint
venture (“JV”) with Libya’s Housing and Infrastructure Board
(“HIB”).213  The new JV would allow several thousand HIB employees
to leave Government of Libya (“GOL”) employment, enter the private
sector; and prompt a sizeable increase in the number of expatriate
Americans working in Libya under AECOM.214  The new JV would ini-
tially focus on projects in Libya; however, the long-term goal is to im-
plement projects throughout the African continent and MENA region
under a Libyan banner.  AECOM will capitalize the new JV and it be-
lieves funding for its project is secure.
Nonetheless, AECOM’s success to date has stemmed mainly
from the relationship of its chairman with the chairman of the HIB,
who was rumoured to be a potential candidate to take over as Prime
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Libya: Berlusconi backs NATO strikes by Italy jets, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2011
3:34 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13188951.
211 Id.
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213 See Press Release, AECOM Technology Corp., AECOM Announces Contract
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(Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://investors.aecom.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=131318&
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Minister in an upcoming cabinet shuffle.215  AECOM’s increased pro-
file places it in the crosshairs of those seeking to extract rents, such as
foreign investors and lenders, but the endeavour remains a potentially
risky proposition.216  As a consequence of the uncertainty in Libya,
AECOM had difficulty determining whether the project should con-
tinue, and it previously completed a pullback of expat employees and
their families working on Libyan infrastructure projects.217
IV. OBLIGATIONS AND RISK MANAGEMENT
1. Obligation to Deliver
A recent lecture by H.E. Dr. Amani Abeid Karume, the former
President of Zanzibar, best summarizes the obligations of the players
involved in infrastructure development and PF in the conflict-stricken
MENA region.218 In his lecture, Mr Karume stressed that, “the West
must now intervene and ‘deliver’ on its democracy model, otherwise
terror, lack of legal, political, and social institutions, and severe pov-
erty may come in democracy’s place.”219  He added that local govern-
ments and regional institutions must also help to deliver on this
promise, and not that they should simply “wait on the West to do it for
them.”220  Mr. Karume also stressed the importance of “human rela-
tions” as being the “number one” skill that individuals working in the
field of PF must have, since it is an important feature to use during
conflicts and disputes.221  Having those skills in place before a project
begins is the best way to mitigate risk and prevent lengthy and costly
litigation.
Mr. Karume mentioned the social duties we each have as law-
yers and managers to help create prosperity and opportunity for the
people of the MENA region.  Furthermore, finance leaders should act
upon those duties to propose new projects and seeing them through to
the end.222  As stated above, doing so means less unemployment, a
safer environment, more competitive markets, less delinquency and vi-
olence, greater access to cleaner energy, and access to very precious
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See AECOM Says Libyan Withdrawal Will Scuff Earnings, FORBES (Feb. 3,
2011), http://www.forbes.com/2011/03/02/aecom-withdraws-from-libya-unrest-
buoys-oil-marketnewsvideo.html.
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commodity resources that act as the “life-blood fuel” of our economies.
Lessons learned from major infrastructure mega-projects, such as the
Mozal Smelter Project in Mozambique, teach us the same idea: getting
involved in riskier projects is what PF is all about, and that the secret
to PF success is allocating those risks in a manner that is mutually
beneficial to the local communities and investors involved. The true
“key elements” to creating investor confidence in MENA’s future and
expanding the PF sector is to follow the Mozal Smelter Project’s motto,
“Together, We Can Make a Difference,” and getting the local communi-
ties involved to work on and buy into any development project under-
taken in the region only bolsters such efforts.223
2. Risk Management “Musts”
Every project entails unique challenges that generate key con-
siderations on risk management, allocation of risk, and project govern-
ance and documentation.  Risk management affects project value and
can be a valuable tool in reducing costly market imperfections and
under-investment in positive net-present value (“NPV”) projects as
well.224 One of the primary reasons why managers say they use project
finance is to “achieve better risk mitigation and improved risk alloca-
tion.”225  Cases like Poland’s A2 Motorway and Petrozuata illustrate a
four-stage process for successful risk management: identification, as-
sessment, mitigation, and allocation.226  In the identification stage,
the objective is to identify and classify project risks into four different
categories: completion risks (completion on time and budget), operat-
ing risks (market demand and throughput, etc.), political/sovereign
risks (expropriation, force majeure events, etc.), and financial risks (in-
terest rate and exchange rate exposures).227 Force majeure events
come in two forms: acts of God (such as floods, earthquakes, or other
natural disasters), which are considered operating failures, and wars,
223 See Williams, supra note 15; see also James J. Emery et al., ADMINISTRATIVE
BARRIERS TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT: REDUCING RED TAPE IN AFRICA 142, 158 (2000);
Kathryn McPhail & Aidan Davy, Integrating Social Concerns into Private Infra-
structure Projects (World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 384, 1998).
224 Tom Marshella, Three R’s: Risk, Return, & Rating, PROJECT FIN. MAG., May
15, 2001, at 5-8.
225 ETSY, supra note 29.
226 Id. at 279-320.
227 See generally Rating Criteria for Infrastructure and Project Finance, FITCH
RATINGS (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.finance-quebec.com/Fitch%20Rating%20Cri-
teria%20project%20finance.pdf (describing various types of risk as categorized by
one financial services firm).
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strikes, riots, and expropriation, which are considered political/sover-
eign risks.228
After identifying the risks, the next step in the process is to
assess the most important risks and then identify risks that may re-
quire active mitigation and management.229  The goal of risk mitiga-
tion is to reduce, in a cost-effective manner, cash flow variability to
increase the project’s debt capacity.230  By narrowing the distribution
of possible returns, risk management allows projects to support lever-
age ratios in excess of 90 percent.231  The final step is allocating risk to
the parties that are best able to control the risks and that can bear
them at least cost, as typically established through long-term con-
tracts.232  To induce optimal contractual behaviour between parties
and reduce incentive conflicts between key decision makers, other gov-
ernance measures, such as “shared ownership,” are required to pre-
vent and resolve conflicts.233
Governments must have the ability to negotiate, monitor, and
enforce agreements to develop certain types of infrastructure.234 When
these contracts are unenforceable, the project’s property rights are un-
certain, cash flows are high, and there is a high risk for expropria-
tion.235 Many infrastructure projects in the MENA region, in
particular where countries have non-existent, untested, or unpredict-
able legal systems, managing sovereign risk becomes one of the most
important and critical tasks of the project manager.236  This is where
the newer “structural” approach, illustrated above, better suits con-
228 C. RICHARD TINSLEY, A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION ON PROJECT FINANCE RISKS,
STRUCTURES AND FINANCEABILITY (1996).
229 See ETSY, supra note 29.
230 Id.
231 TIMOTHY C. IRWIN, THE WORLD BANK: ALLOCATING AND VALUING RISK IN PRI-
VATELY FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 30 (2007).
232 See ETSY, supra note 29; see also DEP’T OF HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, PFI:
STRENGTHENING LONG-TERM PARTNERSHIPS 76, 82-83 (Mar. 2006), http://web
archive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/7/F/bud
06_pfi_618.pdf.
233 IRWIN, supra note 231, at 33.
234 THE WORLD BANK, INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLES OF THE PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SECTORS 15 (Nov. 2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINF
NETWORK/Resources/Rolesupdt.pdf.
235 J.R. Markusen, Contracts, intellectual property rights, and multinational in-
vestment in developing countries, 53 J. INT’L ECON. 189-204 (2001).
236 Nasser Saidi, Forum on Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial Institu-
tions in Line with International Standards and Practices, Corporate Governance
in the Arab countries: Role of the Banking System in ensuring Transparency &
Disclosure (Jan. 2005), http://iodlebanon.org/iodl/Files/13_1.Arab%20Banks.pdf;
M. Haddad & Sam Hakim, The cost of sovereign lending in the Middle East after
September 11, 1 J. GLOBAL BUS. ADVANCEMENT 127-39 (2007).
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temporary risk management needs (with respect to management of
sovereign risk), as opposed to the older and more limited “financial”
approach to risk management.  Under the “financial” approach, spon-
sors simply increase the project’s hurdle rate, and accept only those
projects that generate sufficiently higher returns.237  This may actu-
ally increase project risk, because it makes the sponsors and lenders
appear as if they are profiting at the expense of the local community.
The idea that high rates of return can actually increase and induce
higher project risk is known as the “paradox of infrastructure invest-
ment.”238  Evaluators of project risk must also remember to include
not only negative risks, but also positive risks, such as accepting the
initiatives advanced by an intergovernmental organization that may
be adverse to a nation’s domestic industry. Likewise, high toll collec-
tion from roadway infrastructure projects can result in money which is
unaccounted for in a project that individuals seek to claim. Finally,
evaluators must consider scenarios where one nation is linked to other
nations for commerce and trade, resulting in unfair competition and
higher duty tariffs.
Other factors that must be considered when assessing and allo-
cating project risk are: unexpected natural and operational catastro-
phes that may impact operations, climate change and greenhouse
effects that may adversely impact operations and markets, human re-
source talent pools that may not be adequate in the region to support
growth, and breaches in information technology that may impact the
region’s conduct of business and confidentiality/privacy require-
ments.239  The identification and management of risk ensures better
corporate governance structure, and good governance combined with
social responsibility is key to delivering long-term value to project
shareholders.240
237 BENJAMIN ETSY, THE ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS FOR USING PROJECT FINANCE
(2003), http://www.people.hbs.edu/besty/BCE%20PF%20Motivations%202-14-03.
pdf; SCOTT HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF PROJECT FINANCE (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2008).
238 Andrew F. Haughwout, The Paradox of Infrastructure Investment: Can a Pro-
ductive Good Reduce Productivity?, BROOKINGS REVIEW (2000), http://www.brook-
ings.edu/articles/2000/summer_productivity.aspx.
239 BHP BILLITON, 2010 ANN. REPORT 13 (2010), http://www.youblisher.com/p/
156535-2010-BHP-Billiton-Annual-Report [hereinafter BILLITON ANNUAL REPORT].
For example, the EU has very strict privacy laws, and breaches/disclosures of pri-
vate data can result in huge sanctions if not properly mitigated and reported,
under the EU’s Data Privacy Directive.
240 See generally id. (providing insight into risk management and good corporate
governance techniques utilized by one company to enhance their shareholder
value and project returns).
110 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:1
An ideal project finance check-list would include the following
items: (a) PF Goals List (define the goals and interests of the organiza-
tion, goals of the project, and of your client in the project);  (b) List of
Advantages for using PF (such as non-recourse and limited-recourse
debt, off balance sheet financing, leveraged debt, equity finance, politi-
cal risk diversification, and credit opportunities), as opposed to other
available financing methods for your project (such as the many risk
allocation challenges, lender risk, higher interest rates, higher taxes
and fees, lender monitoring, transaction costs, reporting requirements,
and cost of insurance);  (c) Project Finance Risk Management List,
which includes identification, allocation, and mitigation of risks, and
the development of a “risk matrix” that includes assessing develop-
mental risk, financial risk, design risks, construction risks, start-up
costs, operational risk, environmental risk, completion risk, and politi-
cal risk, and with a section on the possible parties to whom you may
allocate risk, and another section detailing risk mitigation from the
pre-construction stage, to the local partners level, and for project
phases.241
Infrastructure project checklists should always include an en-
vironmental feasibility study, and project managers should look into
warranty risks, contractual risks and remedies, contingency reserves
and management reserves, guarantees and completion agreements, in-
demnification and liquidated damages policies, and plan on how to in-
ternationalize the project if possible.  Foreign Direct Investment PF
checklists should include structural solutions to possible agency con-
flicts, with detailed plans on organizational structure, ownership
structure, capital structure, contractual structure, governance struc-
ture, and board structure.242  Lastly, a sound project checklist will in-
clude project valuation details with the source and value of projected
revenues, a revenue management plan with details of needed long-
term contracts, a list of subsidies and guaranteed cash flow streams
with premiums added to the values of the project and to investments
(if they are risky), an outline of the social cost and internal benefits of
the project, an equity cash flow valuation, and a corporate responsibil-
ity plan detailing the project’s benefits to the local community.243
241 See generally GRAHAM D. VINTER & GARETH PRICE, PROJECT FINANCE: A LEGAL
GUIDE (3d ed. 2006).
242 Louis T. Wells & Eric S. Gleason, Is Foreign Infrastructure Investment Still
Risky? HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 1995, at 44-45.
243 See generally Theodore H. Moran, Transnational Strategies of Protection and
Defence by Multi-National Corporations: Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost
for Nationalization in Natural Resources, 27 INT’L ORG. 273 (1973).
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AFTER THE STORM
1. Internationalization and Partnership
The MENA region needs to invest between $75-100 billion a
year in infrastructure to sustain the growth rates achieved in recent
years, and to boost its economic competitiveness.244  Recent events in
the region have demonstrated that people want better public services,
and the World Bank Group, in cooperation with the Islamic Develop-
ment Bank, is setting up a regional initiative that could raise up to $1
billion in FDI to close the infrastructure gap in the MENA region.245
A new initiative aims to address this shortfall and brings together the
World Bank Group with the Islamic Development Bank as potential
anchor investors in a regional FDI investment, and as vehicles to sup-
port both conventional and Shariah-compliant investment in infra-
structure.246  The new initiative is known as the “Arab Financing
Facility for Infrastructure” (“AFFI”), and it is a partnership of the
World Bank, International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), and the Is-
lamic Development Bank (“IsDB”).247  This initiative “is an integrated
facility which aims at fostering infrastructure development and re-
gional dialogue in the Arab countries.”248  “[The AFFI] focuses on re-
gional infrastructure programs and developing [more FDI for]
PPPs.249 AFFI will support infrastructure projects designed to boost
regional connectivity,” including electricity, rail, road and maritime
networks.250  “A private sector window with IFC and IsDB as anchor
investors will provide private investment to support PPP deals and the
possibility of Shariah-compliant financing.”251  It is important to note
244 THE WORLD BANK, BANK ANNOUNCES FACILITY TO ADDRESS CRITICAL MENA
INFRASTRUCTURE GAP (Oct. 9, 2010), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER-
NAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22730539~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:46
07,00.html.
245 Id.
246 THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK & PARTNERS JOIN EFFORTS TO TACKLE ARAB
WORLD INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://arabworld.worldbank.
org/content/awi/en/home/featured/infrastructure.html [hereinafter WORLD BANK &
PARTNERS].
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. The World Bank, Arab World Initiative (ABI), is a partnership with the
countries of the Arab world “designed to foster effective cooperation and collabora-
tion in the interests of economic integration and knowledge sharing.  The Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Regional Office for the Near
East’s website offers access to the latest data, research, feature stories, briefs,
multimedia presentations and project documentation about efforts in the Arab
world to find opportunity and advantage in economic integration both across the
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here that “World Bank (“IBRD”) lending to the MENA region for infra-
structure projects. . .has already exceeded $1 billion a year and is ex-
pected to increase further in the years ahead to help close the
infrastructure gap.”252  “In addition, over the past four years, IFC has
invested more than $1 billion in infrastructure projects in the region
as well.”253  “IsDB investment in infrastructure projects in the region
over the past 5 years has exceeded $1.3 billion a year, including about
$300 million in PPP projects.”254
In a recent ABI website feature story,255 Mr. Robert B. Zoel-
lick, World Bank Group President stated, “This regional initiative will
unlock new flows of private sector investment to help countries like
Egypt, Morocco, Jordan or Tunisia, eager to push ahead with critical
infrastructure projects that will drive competitiveness and boost much
needed job creation.”256  He added that the proposed regional initiative
would include technical assistance to help governments tackle legal,
policy, and institutional constraints to PPP projects, and develop
cross-border infrastructure projects vital to regional integration and
competitiveness.257  Dr. Ahmad Mohamed Ali, President of the Islamic
Development Bank, headquartered in Jeddah, stated, “The Islamic De-
velopment Bank is excited to be part of this initiative as we know there
is a pipeline of viable infrastructure projects out there and unmet de-
mand,” and that, “The facility will have the flexibility to structure in-
vestments in accordance with Shariah principles, which will attract
untapped, alternative sources of financing.”258  Both the IsDB and the
IFC will work together to explore ways of providing project finance in
both conventional and Shariah-compliant products, which would seek
to attract private investors, especially from the wealthier and devel-
oped Gulf (“GCC”) nations.259  Mr. Lars Tunnel, Executive Vice Presi-
dent and CEO of IFC also elaborated that:
Infrastructure is one of our most important priorities in
the Middle East and North. . .Large investments in in-
region and with the wider world.” FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE ARAB WORLD INITIATIVE AND THE WORLD BANK GROUP (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://neareast.fao.org/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?ID=2402384&lang=EN&I=0&DId
=0&CId=0&CMSId=5000912.
252 WORLD BANK & PARTNERS, supra note 246.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Press Release, The World Bank, Bank announces Facility to Address Critical
MENA Infrastructure Gap (Oct. 9, 2010) (on file with the University of Richmond
Law School Library).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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frastructure are needed across the region. This facility
will demonstrate the viability of infrastructure invest-
ments for both the private sector and governments, and
will help increase investments in this sector and improve
services for a growing population.260
With the internationalization of infrastructure development
project-financings, local government institutions and agencies become
more reluctant to enact laws that permit expropriation of project as-
sets. Prior to the recent period of turmoil, the region’s dictatorial re-
gimes frequently nationalized private property.261 To mitigate such
risks, local authorities should encourage developed areas like the U.S.,
Europe, Asia, and the GCC nations to invest in projects.  This would
trigger protections provided by the Bilateral Investment Treaty
(“BIT”), the Multi-Lateral Investment Treaty (“MIT”), the ICSID Con-
vention,262 and other public and private laws.263
2. Combining Conventional Project Finance and Islamic Finance
The MENA region is comprised of primarily Islamic countries
with large Muslim populations that do business with Asia, Eurasia,
the United States, South America, Europe, and most of the Western
secular world. These countries also do business with the GCC and
260 Id.
261 Martin Amison, Privatization and Project Finance in the Middle East, 14 INT’L
FIN. L. REV. 14 (1995).
262 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, INT’L ECON. L., 536-40, 544-70 (2d ed. 2008) (dis-
cussing the ICSID address investment disputes, the limitations of the ICJ, as an
arbiter in expropriation-related FDI disputes and the “Hull Formula”, a formula
available in most BIT’s, and which provides prompt, adequate, and effective relief
in cases of expropriation and investment-related disputes); see, e.g., Lanco Int’l
Inc. v. Argentine Republic, 40 I.L.M. 457 (2001), ICSID case No. ARB/97/B; Wena
Hotels, Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 41 I.L.M. 881 (2002), ICSID case No. ARB/
98/4 (discussing ICSID investment disputes and related protections); Feldman v.
Mexico, 42 I.L.M. 625 (2003), ICSID case No. ARB (AF) 99/1 (discussing specific
NAFTA related protections); see also United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir.
2004) (discussing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) protections that may
be available in the U.S. Courts, to a government or corporation/lender/sponsor/
owner that may be subject to the Act, when they are parties to an investment
project and have payment-related disputes). Accord Harris Corp. v. Nat’l. Iranian
Radio & T.V., 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing disputes that involve
Letters of Credit); American Bell Intl., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F.
Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
263 See DANIEL C. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 375, 444 (Aspen Publishers
2010). See generally Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20)
(regarding to expropriation and a discussion on BIT and MIT protection and
concerns).
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Southeast Asian nations, which represent the other predominantly
Muslim societies.264  Attracting Muslim investors and Shariah-compli-
ant loans from those outside areas, and combining Islamic Finance
(“IF”) and Islamic Banking (“IB”) with traditional PF methods, is
quickly becoming one of the best ways to secure project financing in
the MENA region .265  It will also prove to be one of the most utilized
strategies to PF in the region, as Muslim investors become more confi-
dent in PF to provide a solid return on their investments.266  N.B.
Many project ventures also fail in the region because the people they
employ from outside do not have specific knowledge in Islamic Finance
or do not pursue it as a possible means to financing their projects in
the region.
Muslims now represent one quarter of the world’s population,
and Muslim countries control 10% of the global GDP.267  They re-
present an increasingly important segment of the global economy, but
nevertheless, few know much about Islamic finance, other than the ba-
sic and rudimentary requirement that interest is forbidden.  What es-
sentially is Islamic finance then?  To start with, even the term
“Islamic,” when applied to banking or finance is considered inappropri-
ate by some based on the belief that Allah’s word applies to both Mus-
lims and non-Muslims alike.268  Some Muslims prefer terms such as
profit bank and equity investor instead of Islamic bank or Islamic
investor.269
Shariah law lays down the main prohibitions that distinguish
Islamic Finance from traditional finance.270  Interest returned on any
investment is prohibited to prevent social exploitation and maximize
social benefits.271  This highlights the emphasis on social welfare over
individual welfare in Islam in general, as directed by Allah and the
Muslim holy book, the Qur’an. Uncertainty in contracts is also consid-
ered un-Islamic and is prohibited under Shariah law, which again, dic-
tates Islamic Finance.272  For example, the sale of a building, prior to
264 Masood Ahmed et al., Trade Competitiveness and Growth MENA, THE WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM’S ARAB WORLD COMPETITIVENESS REVIEW (2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2010/103010.htm.
265 Id.
266 See Paul Wouters, Islamic Private Equity and Venture Capital Conference, Is-
lamic Private Equity Opportunities in the Middle East (2009).
267 See generally The Future of the Global Muslim Population, THE PEW FORUM ON
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Jan. 27, 2011), http://pewforum.org/The-Future-of-the-
Global-Muslim-Population.aspx.
268 VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 17, at 27.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 23.
271 Id. at 2; MUHAMMAD AYUB, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC FINANCE 54-57 (2007).
272 AYUB, supra note 271.
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its constructing is forbidden, due to the uncertainty of its existence at
the time of contract.273  Shariah also prohibits any financing or com-
mercial transactions related to the use of pork products or alcohol.274
But more than the interpretive uncertainty that surrounds various IF
topics, the real issues that divide Islamic countries is the degree to
which the state and government institutions integrate Islamic princi-
ples into everyday life and business.275  There are countries such as
Pakistan, Iran and Sudan, where the entire economic and political sys-
tem is tied to Islamic principles;276 and others more moderate nations
such as Bahrain, Kuwait and Turkey, which embrace Islamic banking
via support of a dual banking system with conventional banks.277
There are countries that neither discourage nor support IF and IB,
such as Egypt, Singapore, and Indonesia;278 and yet others that totally
discourage IB and IF, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, which believe
that by declaring certain financial institutions as Islamic, they would
be implicitly branding others as un-Islamic, and therefore prefer not to
distinguish them.279
Profit is not the sole purpose of an IB or IF, as opposed to our
profit-mined conventional banks.280 The IB’s prefer to share in the fi-
nancial risks and reward with customers, rather than view the rela-
tionship as creditor and debtor.281  A Shariah committee oversees the
operation of IB institution, and they meet quarterly to discuss the IB’s
products and transactions.282  The committees determine what is per-
missible, known as halal, and what is not, known as haram.283  IBs
derive their deposit base from two main sources, “transaction depos-
its,” which do not pay interest and do not have insurance on deposits
but are treated as if they were shares in a firm where the IB pays a
273 Id.
274 Shah M. Nizami, Note, Islamic Finance: The United Kingdom’s Drive to Be-
come the Global Islamic Finance Hub and the United States’ Irrational Indiffer-
ence to Islamic Finance, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 219, 223 (2011).
275 See generally AYUB, supra note 271, at 459 (discussing many Muslim countries
reluctance to promote Islamic Finance).
276 Mone Wai Nie & Ramin Maysami, Empirical Evidence on Islamic Banking:
Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, 3 E. ASIAN ECON. ISSUES 387-401 (1997).
277 INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE GULF: A SOCIOECONOMIC REVOLUTION (Jean-Fran-
c¸ois Sezneck & Mimi Kirk eds., Routeledge Pub. 2011).
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 See AYUB, supra note 271, at 9.
281 ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE: NEW PERSPECTIVES AND PROFIT-SHARING AND
RISK (Munawar Iqbal & David T. Llewellyn eds., Edward Eldgar Pub. 2002).
282 See AYUB, supra note 271, at 387-88 (describing a Shariah committee’s respon-
sibilities in overseeing an IB institution).
283 Business & Economics,THE ECONOMIST (2002).
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return only based any profit earned by the investment of the deposits,
and “equity capital.”284
The main instruments used by IB institutions in IF are: (a)
Modaraba (trust financing) where under a contract, an IB provides the
capital to finance a project, and the entrepreneur provides the man-
agement skills to manage the project; (b) Moshakara (profit sharing)
where the contract is similar to the Modaraba except that the partners
are not confined to distinct roles, as either financier or manager, and
the provision of capital and expertise are shared; and (c) Preferred
Stock, where the offering of different dividend pay-offs is not permit-
ted, but the utilization of different classes of common stock is.285  Debt-
like instruments in IF include: (a) Morabaha (cost-plus financing) the
IB’s profit is the difference between the price paid for the commodity
and the price paid by its client; (b) Ijara (leasing), where the IB
purchase the asset and then leases it for a rate that is periodically
reviewed; (c) Mukarada, which is similar to a revenue bond issued by
an IB to finance a specific project, but the investors have no voting
rights and are only entitled to a proportional interests in profits and
losses of the venture; (d) Salam (a forward purchase) where payment
is made at the time of signing the contract; and (e) Istisna’ (commis-
sioned manufacture) which is a contract where one party agrees to buy
goods from a second party, with payment occurring at a future date.286
The strengths of IF are best demonstrated by the qualitative changes
that are occurring in the industry. Rather than becoming entangled in
ideological debates, practitioners have instead created new product
lines that are now available for investors, the corporate world, and
wealth managers. . .The MENA region now accounts for three-fourths
of global Shariah-compliant assets.  This dominant position is often ob-
scured by the uneven developments in the region.287
The GCC, however, the most stable area of the MENA region,
appears to be taking the lead on the operational side, and IF now ac-
counts for 10% of the GCC’s project finance.288  A substantial number
of deals are emerging to finance mega infrastructure projects with a
284 THE HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC BANKING 106 (M. Kabir Hassan & Mervyn K. Lewis
eds., 2007).
285 SUDIN HARON & NURSOFIZA WAN AZMI, ISLAMIC FINANCE BANKING SYSTEM
(2009).
286 ABU UMAR FARUQ AHMAD, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN ISLAMIC FINANCE:
THE CASE ANALYSIS FROM AUSTRALIA (2010).
287 Shamshad Akhtar, Vice President, Middle East and N. Afr. World Bank, Sym-
posium on Islamic Finance in Roma, Developments in the MENA Region: Islamic
Finance Seminar (Nov. 11, 2009), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22391906~menuPK:22465
54~pagePK:2865106~piPK:2865128~theSitePK:256299,00.html.
288 Id.
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combination of IF and traditional finance methods.289  A prime exam-
ple, Abu Dhabi’s recent project-financing for a $1.6 Billion USD inde-
pendent water and power plant in the city’s Shuweihat District,
included a significant Islamic tranche.290  “This deal stands out as the
longest tenor for any IF deal in the region at 20 years.”291
IF has a varied presence in the MENA region.  For example, IF
initially had a strong presence in Egypt.292  Today, IB only has about a
seven percent market share in the region, which indicates the coun-
try’s more cautious approach following the collapse of numerous Is-
lamic money management firms in the 1980s.293 In Tunisia, on the
other hand, there is only one active Islamic bank, which opened in
2010.294 Similarly, Morocco only recently authorized fully-fledged Is-
lamic Banking. The government previously permitted limited Islamic
Banking, and only allowed conventional banks to offer Ijara leasing
products, Murabaha contracts to buy and re-sell underlying goods, and
Musharaka co-ownership financing structures.295 It also imposed
higher taxes on IF products than on conventional banking products.296
Unlike other countries, which depend on a regulator-led ap-
proach to IF, MENA takes a distinctive, industry-driven approach.297
One of the key concerns with this approach is the lack of regulatory
infrastructure development.298  For example, some MENA countries
do not have a specific IF policy for regulators or laws mandating indus-
try regulation in general.299  Nor do they have laws mandating
Shariah compliance within their country or any adopted Islamic bank-
ing regulations for neighbouring countries.300 These Islamic banks are
thus regulated and supervised within conventional, prudential regula-
tory frameworks similar to traditional banks.301
289 Id.
290 Id.; see also Shuweihat Independence Water and Power: Expanding Water in
Abu Dhabi, PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF CORP., http://www.pbworld.com/capabili-
ties_projects/shuweihat_independent_water_and_power_project.aspx (last visited
Oct. 24, 2011).
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Mona Yahia, Islamic Bank a first for Tunisia, MAGHAREBIA (June 2, 2010),
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/
2010/06/02/feature-03.
295 See Akhtar, supra note 287.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
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Although IBs did report greater losses than conventional banks
during the first half of 2009, due in large part to their greater exposure
to the real estate and construction sectors, they tend to be less affected
by financial crises than conventional banks due to their large capital,
liquidity, and the risk-sharing aspect of Shariah-compliant contracts
that allow banks to pass some losses on to investors.302 While the
unique features of IBs may provide additional robustness to risk and
uncertainty, they still face many of the same credit risk exposures as
traditional finance; mainly because, at the heart of their businesses,
IBs operate on similar lines in terms of raising cash flow resources and
recycling them.303 IF’s “exclusion principles,” such as the ban on trans-
actions and activities that are interest-based, or that deal with specu-
lative products, do keep IB’s risks better contained.304  This also helps
discourage leveraging.305
The counter-argument holds that a comparatively small and
concentrated market in Shariah-compliant products leads to the con-
centration of risk, and “real asset” transactions required by IBs are
usually complex and costly, while involving greater bank risk exposure
to the underlying tangible assets.306  Unrecognized legal and transac-
tions risks in IBs could also be higher if banks are involved in newer
Shariah-compliant products and services. Almost all IBs face Shariah
compliance risks that are subject to different interpretations, depend-
ing on the Islamic jurisprudence followed in each nation.307  Therefore,
in view of the recent uprisings in the region, and the aforementioned
risks, it is important that arrival of democracy in the region also
means a steady launch and sustained effort to strengthen regulatory
and supervisory infrastructures.308 The Islamic Financial Services
Board (“IFSB”) has already played a valuable role in this regard, by
developing an Islamic financial regulatory and supervisory infrastruc-
ture, and it is now providing capacity building to its members.309  The
World Bank group also recognizes the IF industry’s potential.310  Be-
sides support to the IFSB, the World Bank has been selectively sup-
porting specific transactions in the region, with the objective of
promoting innovative Shariah-compliant financing vehicles and the
development of regulatory systems and corporate governance to under-
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
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pin those operations.311  The Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (“MIGA”), which provides investment guarantees against polit-
ical risk, was hired recently to provide political risk insurance for an
IF structure funded Djibouti project.312
The World Bank has also set up an Islamic development work-
ing group to promote IF.313  The group will work with regulators and
banks to promote the introduction of Shariah-compliant financial ser-
vices, and examine ways on how to exploit IF in the MENA region.
This will promote access to social development, product development,
infrastructure financing via PPP’s, and regional infrastructure
projects.314  Asian companies and financial players are also becoming
increasingly active in the Middle East to secure access to energy re-
sources.315  The MENA region in general has seen a surge in bidders
from Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Japan, India, China, and others, as
evidenced by bids for the regional IWPP’s, such as the UAE project
mentioned above.316 For many large-scale projects in the Middle East,
funding procurement is now commonly done through a combination of
conventional financing and Islamic financing. Sovereign Wealth Funds
are diversifying as well, and combining IF with traditional finance on
energy and infrastructure projects.317  In fact, the use of combined fi-
nance methods is becoming so popular, that the Islamic Development
Bank (“IDB”) is raising capital for a second infrastructure fund, called
the EMP Energy Fund, and it plans to invest 80 percent in energy and
20 percent in infrastructure projects throughout the GCC and MENA
region, as well as South-East Asia.318
Over the past several years, even larger institutions such as
the Dow Jones have created Islamic investment funds, due to the
growing interest in IF.319  One of the biggest challenges and opportu-
nities in the Islamic world today is infrastructure development and
attracting investment to PF in this area – the main theme of this
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note.320  By one estimate, over the next ten years, the potential market
for infrastructure projects in the MENA region is $45-60 Billion USD,
and there are now well over 300 project-financed infrastructure
projects pending in the MENA region - not including those in the oil,
gas, and petroleum sectors.321  Localized currency financing of these
and the many projects that are emerge in the region daily will stress
the local banking structure and soon outstrip its capabilities, given
that most MENA region countries are poor and make few actual
deposits.322
To capitalize on the possibility of prosperity, infrastructure
building or other economic development opportunities in the region re-
quires international investment capital. The key will be to create co-
financing or “combined financing” structures, which integrate interna-
tional capital with regional Islamic principles, linking traditional fi-
nancing formats with Shariah-compliant IF methods and
instruments.323  Through innovations like co-funding and co-financ-
ing, Islamic countries of the MENA region will be able to invest in
their much-needed local infrastructure projects, while simultaneously
meeting the interests of Islamic investors and citizens in those devel-
oping Muslim communities.324  To do so, however, Islamic bankers will
have to resolve complex legal, financial, and religious issues that fall
into play with IF.325  The continued evolution of Shariah principles is
not only necessary for the growth of IF institutions, but also for the
successful development and growth of Islamic countries in the MENA
region.326
3. CDM and Carbon Financing for Renewable Energy Projects
Unlocking the potential of clean energy sources and carbon as-
sets in the MENA region is crucial in securing its growth and prosper-
ity in the immediate future. It is also necessary to combat climate
change and to ensure the health of the global environment in gen-
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eral.327  Solar, wind, and other clean energy exportation projects are
vital, and are already under way in the region.328  High revenues from
these types of projects can be used to finance the major infrastructure
and re-building needs of the region.329 Currently, investment from the
outside is bountiful for clean energy and exportation-related projects
in the region.  Infrastructure development, however, still requires in-
vestment, and that will be achieved when conflict moves out of the
region. Increasingly, foreign owners, sponsors, and lenders seek to im-
prove their social responsibility efforts in the MENA region. They
make it a point to deliver better governance on projects, so as to add
value for their shareholders.330  Investors also seek access to the large
revenues that can be achieved when exporting clean energy to areas
like Europe, the U.S., and Asia – all of whom are eager to move away
from foreign oil dependency and reduce their carbon imprints.331
Financing for such projects is done via an innovative process
known as Carbon Financing (“CF”), which utilizes Clean Development
Mechanism (“CDM”), (one of the “flexibility” mechanisms defined in
the Kyoto Protocol).332 Annex I parties are industrialized countries
and non-Annex I parties are developing countries.333  CDM is defined
in Article 12 of the Protocol, and is intended to assist parties not in-
cluded in Annex I to achieve sustainable development and contribute
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to the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”): to prevent dangerous climate
change.334  It also assists parties included in Annex I to achieve com-
pliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction com-
mitments (greenhouse gas and emission caps).335  How CF works is
that Annex I countries are permitted to meet part of their caps by us-
ing “Certified Emission Reductions” from CDM emission reduction
projects in developing countries (such as all of the MENA region na-
tions discussed in this note).336  This is subject to oversight, so as to
ensure that emission reductions are real and “additional.”337  The
CDM and Carbon Financing process is supervised by the CDM Execu-
tive Board (“CDM EB”) and is under the guidance of the Conference of
the Parties (“COP/MOP”) of the UNFCCC.338
CDM allows industrialized countries to direct emission-reduc-
tion investment into the cheapest option.339  Countries began register-
ing CDM projects in 2001 and the Kyoto commitment period will end
in 2012.340  During that span, the CDM is expected to reduce emis-
sions by about 1.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide.341
A new modality of CDM also addresses several weaknesses.
Named as the “Programme of Activities,” it moves away from accredit-
ing single projects, and instead bundles all projects of one type of activ-
ity and accredits them all together.342  Emissions reductions by Annex
I countries are allowed to use flexible mechanisms for financing emis-
sion reduction projects, renewable energy projects, reforestation
projects, and fossil fuel projects abroad, via the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. – in
the MENA region, where there are no emissions targets for non-Annex
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I countries).343  Flexible finance mechanisms include CDM, Joint Im-
plementation, and International Emissions Trading.344
Carbon financing funds mainly consist of carbon credit
purchasing funds and there are only a few PF funds in this area (again
room for improvement and opportunity).345  Fortunately, new funds
are on the rise and project finance in this area of investment will grow
rapidly as governments of Annex I countries, as well as their corpora-
tions, banks, and investment funds, all vie for emission reduction cred-
its in the next ten years.346  These organizations will also compete for
priority positioning to these renewable energy projects in the vastly
untapped MENA region.347
VI. CONCLUSION
The Arab Spring’s “winds of change” will generate increased
opportunities for the utilisation of Project Finance in infrastructure
development projects and renewable energy projects in the MENA re-
gion. It should be cantered on the exportation of various forms of clean
energy, fuels, and commodities to more developed partner nations.
The international community has a lot of work to do now in this re-
gion, and should not wait for things to settle down before investigating
and proposing new projects. We should be more involved in existing
projects as per our social responsibilities. Any lawyer, analyst, spon-
sor, lender or project manager involved, must always keep a level
head.  Many agree that this is the time for us to deliver on our
promises of prosperity and freedom; especially with the fresh advent of
democracy throughout the MENA region.  By making funds, knowl-
edge, institutions and other resources more readily available, we will
provide a much-needed boost to the region and to its markets and
projects, and also help prevent other non-productive ideologies from
taking a foothold in their place.
This form of new and positive activity will assist in greater
prosperity for the region’s inhabitants, and thus trigger the facilitation
of increased trade between the region and its partners, spurring global
economic recovery.  The WTO must take the lead on the trade facilita-
tion end, and assess the legal infrastructure that is in place as the
region rebuilds. The WTO should work closely with its members to ad-
dress any competition and antitrust concerns as well, as part of its
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overall re-vamping processes. The international community should be
looking at the future of Project Finance and Infrastructure Develop-
ment in this region optimistically.
Project financiers should be prudent during the region’s devel-
opment process and not fear risk to achieve our desired benefits. For
those who have an interest in the worlds of Project Finance, Global
Trade, and Infrastructure Development, the joys of managing the
unique challenges, risks, and benefits mentioned above are just now
beginning to unfold across a prospering and revitalized region.
